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(Mitchell and Black, 1995, p.190). Loewald’s subsequent revision of Freud’s drive theory (1971, 1972, 1976, 1978, 1988) required a radical reformulation of Freud’s traditional psychoanalytic concepts. While for Freud the id is a biological force clashing with social reality, for Loewald the id is an interactional product of adaptation. Loewald views the mind as interactive by its very nature, not just secondarily in response to the need for others for gratification. Loewald theorized that in the beginning there is no distinction between self and other, ego and external reality, or instincts and objects; rather there is an original unitary whole composed of both baby and caregiver. He proposed that “Instincts understood as psychic and motivational forces become organized as such through interactions within a psychic field, consisting originally of the mother-child (psychic) unit” (Loewald, 1971, p118). In viewing instincts/drives as the product of interaction , Loewald extends Jacobson’s thesis that the instincts were a link between the infant’s self and its objects. Going further, Loewald identifies interaction as the critical aspect in the internalization of the subjective representation of the self and other, highlighting the interaction as a basic building block of the mind. Loewald’s work transformed psychoanalytic metapsychology and allowed for novel approaches to conceptualizing clinical material. His influence, direct and indirect, may be seen in developments within a variety of psychoanalytic schools of thought (e.g. Object Relations, Relational/Intersubjective, Self Psychology) and thus can be viewed as a bridge between so called ‘one-person’ and ‘two-persons’ perspectives on the psychoanalytic clinical process. Most broadly, just as was the case for Winnicott in the UK, Loewald and Jacobson in the US can be seen as the forerunners of the intersubjective movement. In the 1980’s, increasingly complex and inclusive Freudian thought is exemplified by comprehensive reviews and extensions the conceptualizations of the self in works of Leo Rangell (1982) and Harold Blum (1982). Rangell amends Hartmann’s definition of narcissism as the libidinal investment not of the self, but of the self-representations, stating that: “All that the ego knows about its self, the ‘I’ which surrounds it and of which it is a part, is the present state of the self-representations at each stage of development and at any moment of existence” (Rangell 1982, p. 879). Blum, focusing on the complexities of early development as depicted by Mahler (Mahler et al. 1975), maintains: “No self-concept is possible before a child emerges from the symbiotic orbit with the gradual onset of the process of separation-individuation” (Blum 1982, p. 971). His is inclusive developmental synthesis of Rene Spitz’ ‘reciprocal dialogue’ (1965), Winnicott’s ‘transitional object (1965) and Piaget’s (1951) ‘object permanence’, weaved into the template of Mahler’s ‘separation-individuation’, presenting a complex outline of progressive-regressive changes, within the matrix of object relations and underlying conflicts, leading to the emergence of cohesive self-representation and a relatively continuous sense of self, only after the advancement of self and object constancy in the third year of life.
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