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but retains no trace of them, and memory systems within the apparatus, which transform momentary excitations of the perceptual system into permanent traces, the memory traces (“Erinnerungsspuren”) (Freud, 1900, pp. 537–41). In fact, the metapsychological notion of a memory trace is very close to the concept of Vorstellung in this sense (see also De Mijolla, 2002, p. 1452]), and thus to Hume´s concept of the idea. Moreover, Freud´s (1900, pp. 565–6) account of desire in that chapter also presupposes the same conception of mental representation, for the memory image (“Erinnerungsbild”) of the perception of food, which the desire tries to invest anew in order to evoke the perception itself again, corresponds closely to the concept of Vorstellung or idea in Hume’s sense (Herrera, 2010). This is particularly clear in the passage in The Negation (1925) where Freud writes that all mental representations(“Vorstellungen”) arise from perceptions and are repetitions of them. (In the original German: ““alle Vorstellungen von Wahrnehmungenstammen, Wiederholungenderselben sind” (Freud 1925b, p.14). In the SE: “all presentations [Vorstellungen] originate from perceptions and are repetitions of them.” Freud (1925a, p. 237). An important aspect of Freudian metapsychology is the relationship between the mental representation (“Vorstellung”) of the object and the drive. For Freud, erotic or amorous attraction to an object consists of the mental representation of the object being invested (charged, cathected) with libido (affect) originating from the drive (from a bodily source). It is in this way that one becomes aware of the drive, that the drive manifests itself in the psyche. This mental representation invested with libido (affect) is therefore the drive representative (“Triebrepräsentanz”), which then has two components: on the one hand, the mental representation of the object, and on the other, the affect (the libido invested in that mental representation). Freud calls the first component ¨Vorstellungsrepräsentanz¨, a compound German expression whose translation has been the subject of great controversy. The first part of this compound (“Vorstellung”) expresses relationship of image and can hence be translated as “(mental) representation” or as idea. The second part of the compound (“Repräsentanz”) expresses a relationship of ¨delegation¨ and can be translated as representative. Herrera (2010) claims that the translation of this compound must preserve the attributive semantic relationship that exists between both concepts in the original German expression, in which the first one (“Vorstellung”) expresses an attribute of the second one (“Repräsentanz”), so that the compound ¨Vorstellungsrepräsentanz¨ denotes a representative that has the attribute of being itself a mental representation. Herrera (2010) claims additionally that, in consequence, widely used Spanish translations would not appear accurate in transmitting the intended meaning of the original Freudian compound expression in German, like the translation “representante-representativo” in the Spanish version of the Dictionary of Psychoanalysis of Laplanche and Pontalis (1993) or the rendering “agencia representante-representación” in the translation of the complete works of Freud in Spanish by Etcheverry (Freud 1976; Etcheverry 1978). Herrera maintains that Freud’s intended meaning is better conveyed by translations in Spanish that preserve this attributive relationship, such as “representante ideativo”, which corresponds to Strachey’s translation in the Standard Edition as well as in English translation of Laplanche and Pontalis
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