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(1973) as “ideational representative”. Taking these considerations into account, Herrera (2010, p.805) considers that this Freudian concept can be defined as follows: “The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz [ ideational representative ] would then be the Vorstellung, i.e. the mental representation (idea) of the object of the drive, which (invested with the quota of affect i.e. with libido coming from the somatic source and seeking discharge), has the role of being the Repräsentanz, i.e. the representative or delegate of the drive in the psyche.” (Herrera 2010, p. 805). In The Unconscious (1915) Freud differentiates, within the conscious (mental)representation of the object, the word-representation (“Wortvorstellung”) on the one hand and the thing-representation(“Sachvorstellung”) on the other hand. He indicates that the thing-representation consists of the cathexis, if not directly of memory images of things (“Sacherinnerungsbilder”), at least of memory traces (“Erinnerungspuren”) derived from them. In his essay on aphasias, Freud (1891) talks about this same concept, although he calls it object- representation (“Objektvorstellung”), and he defines it as an associative complex composed of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinesthetic or other mental representations of great diversity. Using more contemporary language, Herrera proposes to define the thing-representation as the sensory or sensorimotor record of the perceived object. In his metapsychological texts, Freud (1915 b, c) claims that the conscious (mental) representation encompasses the thing-representation plus the corresponding word- representation, whereas the unconscious (mental)representation is only the thing- representation. He also establishes a relationship between these two types of (mental) representations and the systems of his Topographic model. Thus, he indicates that the Unconscious system contains the ¨thing-cathexes of objects¨ (therefore, the thing- representations), whereas the Preconscious system arises through the connection of the thing- representations with the corresponding word-representations. He concludes that repression denies the rejected thing-representation its translation into words, so it must remain repressed in the Unconscious system. Furthermore, according to Jose Renato Avzaradel (2024), Freudian metapsychological texts (1915 a, b, c) contain important cues to understand the passage from the somato-sensory function to the psyche and of the construction of mental representations. Freudian concept of instinct or drive derives from the process of how soma and psyche interrelate, especially as it regards drives’ reaching the mind (1915a, b): “Insofar as instinct cannot be an object of consciousness, the observation of its deflections is all we can rely on to infer its presence, which places instinct on the same pathway as the mnemic trace, its primary psychic inscription.” (Avzaradel, 2024, p.1025). The course of the constitution of traces and of instincts or drives is the same, which helps one to grasp how instincts can cathect the traces and how somatic forces and their impressions on the psyche takes place (Avzaradel, 2024).
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