From Palestine to Lebanon: Israel's Expansionist Plan

The history of Lebanon and the history of the Palestinian struggle have been closely intertwined, and this is not by accident. Often portrayed by Israel as a necessary security response, it reveals, in fact, a core driver of the Zionist project, illustrating its regional colonial scope and expansionist ambitions, and in turn, how resistance has also become regionalised.


FROM PALESTINE TO LEBANON: ISRAEL’S EXPANSIONIST PLAN
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APRIL 2026
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EXPLAINER
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WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
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Lebanon is Israel’s second major target
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Israel’s interest in Lebanon is long standing, not reactive
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Resistance in Lebanon was shaped by occupation
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Israel has been a central force in Lebanon’s wars and instability
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Today’s escalation reflects a broader expansionist project
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EARLY ZIONISM AND LEBANON
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ISRAEL AND THE LEBANON CIVIL WAR
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The LNM was a coalition of leftist, secular, and reformist parties which included:
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ISRAEL AND THE LEBANON CIVIL WAR
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This intervention escalated in 1978 with Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon under “Operation Litani”. Presented as an effort to dislodge the PLO and halt cross border operations, the underlying goal, however, was far more extensive. Over the course of a single week, around 2,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, and approximately 250,000 people were displaced. Although Israel withdrew following a United Nations Security Council resolution, it left behind a proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), to maintain its influence, working in coordination with right wing forces such as the Phalange to achieve the objectives of expelling the PLO from Lebanon.
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When this strategy failed to eliminate the PLO, Israel launched a far more extensive invasion in 1982. Israeli forces advanced all the way to Beirut, killing at least 20,000 people. Electricity, water, and food supplies were cut, while widespread bombings of the city killed hundreds of civilians, often under the guise of a “targeted” assassination of a PLO leader or the destruction of “PLO infrastructure”.
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These tactics - siege, largescale air bombing campaigns, and so-called “targeted” assassinations and “targeted” dismantling of “terrorist” infrastructure - which in practice meant widespread destruction, reflected a broader pattern of colonial military strategy that would later be deployed against Palestinians elsewhere.
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In August 1982, an agreement was reached for the PLO to withdraw from Lebanon. Just one month later, with the PLO gone and the Palestinian refugee camps left unprotected, the Israeli military surrounded the Sabra and Shatila camps in West Beirut, permitting the Phalange forces to enter the camps and kill up to 3,500 Palestinian refugees and Lebanese civilians. The Sabra and Shatila massacares were subsequently taken as a lesson by resistance forces about the dangers of disarmament.
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THE FORMATION AND RISE OF HIZBALLAH
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2023 AND AFTER
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In the years following 2006, Hizballah and Israel maintained a balance of force, with the 2006 war demonstrating Hizballah’s ability to withstand and respond to Israeli aggression. This balance shifted in 2023.
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Following the Hamas-led operation on 7 October and the start of Israel’s genocidal campaign against the Gaza Strip, Hizballah opened up what it called a “support front” in solidarity with Gaza on the 8 October. The aim was to draw some Israeli military resources and attention away from Gaza and maintain a degree of pressure against Israel from the north.
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Israel, however, saw this as an opportunity to finally destroy Hizballah as an organisation, carrying out large scale attacks. Between October 2023 and November 2024, Israeli attacks in Lebanon killed around 4,000 people, injured around 16,000, and displaced around 180,000.
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The war significantly degraded Hizballah as a fighting force, ultimately compelling a ceasefire in November 2024.
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The ceasefire lasted until March 2026, during which time 15,000 violations were recorded as having been committed by Israel. With Hizballah weakened, Israel estbalished five “military positions” and two “buffer zones” inside Lebanon during this period, effectively reinstating renewed Israeli occupation in
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parts of the country. Recently, there have also been calls from within Israel for the pursuit of settlement inside parts of south Lebanon.
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Such plans, however, face ongoing resistance. In March 2026, following the US-Israeli war on Iran that began in late February, and amid reports that Israel was planning to restart the war and conclusively finish the campaign against Hizballah, the group surprised observers by reopening its front against Israel.
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In early April 2026, a US/Israel - Iran ceasefire was announced, though its scope remained contested. Iran and mediators indicated that Lebanon was included, but Israel continued its operations against Hizballah. Just hours after the ceasefire announcement, Israel launched one of the deadliest airstrikes Lebanon has seen in years. Within 10 minutes over 100 strikes hit the country targeting densely populated areas, killing more than 250 people and injuring thousands.*
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ZIONISM’S EXPANSIONISM
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THE RIGHT OF RETURN AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
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www.makan.org.uk

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