Populo Spring 2017

Populo.

V Iosl suume e1 1 2017

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This journal is published by students and staff at the Department of political and Cultural Studies at Swansea University. The online version can be found at https://projects.swan.ac.uk/populo/ All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form or binging or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on subsequent publisher. © Swansea University

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Chief Editor Heather Harvey American Studies Editors Benjamin Armitage War and Society Vickie Neal American Studies Kyle Johnson Politics and International Relations Alex Roberts War and Society

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Populo Issue 1 Volume 1 Table of Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………… p.5 Natalie Blight, ‘What were the main terrorist threats faced by the U.S.A. during the 1960s and 1970?’ (AM -338) ...………………... p.6 Camilla de Paula-Yarmohamma di, ‘To what extent (if any) did European colonizers of Australia engage in conscious campaign of genocide against Australia’s indigenous inhabitants?’ (PO -256) .. p.22 Elizabeth Gardner, ‘Critically discuss the view that writers, artists and film-makers have been unjustifiably pre-occupied with the concept of the hero in their representations of war. ’ (HUA -308) ...………… p.34 Robin Hill, ‘The Impossible Dream: Transcendental Idealism in Liberal Utopian Thought’ (HUP -201) …………………………... p.48 Jamie Margetson, ‘In the Centre and in the Periphery : The Economic Ideas and Legacies of Raúl Prebisch. ’ (PO -345) ……………….. p.63 Tyler Walsh, ‘Denver et al suggest that ‘in recent years, constituency campaign have played an increasingly significant part i n elections’ (2012, p. 181). Analyse the continuing relevance of ground campaigning in the post- modern campaigning environment.’ (PO -234) ……………………………………………………………………. p.88 Barnaby West, ‘ Examine the Reasons Why Nuclear Tensions Between the USA and the USSR fell during the period from 1962- 1969.’ (AM -330) ………………………………………………… p.98

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Wesley Schorah, ‘A Critical Analysis of United Nations Interventions in the 1990’s: Responsibility to Protect or Western Imperialism?’ (HUA-304) ……………………………………………………… p.111 Call for Papers ………………………………………………….. p.148

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Introduction The Political and Cultural Studies Department at Swansea University have decided to create a biannual undergraduate journal to showcase some of the excellent work produced by its students. We would like to thank Evelien Bracke for the insight she provided and the knowledge she instilled in us to create and run an undergraduate journal. Many thanks also go to Harry Maines-Allen for suggesting the name Populo . Political and Culture Studies covers a wide range of subjects under the umbrellas of American Studies, Politics and International Relations, and War and Society - the name needed to encapsulate all these elements. Populo is the Latin for ‘by the people’ bu t can also be translated as ‘for the people.’ As the journal is led by students, comprised of the work of students, and for the students, it plays on this idea. It is also reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's speech nicely encompassing the various interests of each subject area. The current editorial team consists of five dedicated students; Benjamin Armitage, Heather Harvey, Kyle Johnson, Vickie Neal, and Alex Roberts, with guidance and support from Eugene Miakinkov.

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What were the main terrorist threats faced by the U.S.A. during the 1960s and 1970s? Natalie Blight - AM-338 The United States of America, during the 1960s and 1970s, oversaw a dramatic turn in the nature of terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism was the primary tactic utilised in order to encourage ‘fundamental political change’ on a domestic level. 1 This would extend to a global scale facilitating a key transition from an era of domestic threats to international terrorism, which J. Bowyer Bell and Ted Gurr claim to be ‘the mo st dramatic innovation in violent politics of this generation.’ 2 This essay shall discuss how notions of revolution, and a transition to terrorism on an international level, are represented through the main terrorist threats during these turbulent decades. The youth movements of the early 1960s adopted acts of violence and symbolic threats to promote their anti-war sentiments, an overstated threat that would eventually dissipate as the Vietnam War ended. Anti-Colonialism, portrayed through the actions of Puerto Rican Separatists and Croatian Nationalists, employed revolutionary terrorism in their fight for independence from America. This would be a rising threat from earlier decades that would escalate to a critical level during the 1970s. The increased number of hijackings and hostage situations encouraged widespread media involvement and exposure to the horrific nature of terrorism, but would also force the

1 J. Bowyer Bell and Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Terrorism and Revolution in America’, in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives , ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (United States: SAGE Publications, 1979), p. 330. 2 Ibid, p. 333.

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President to officially acknowledge the threats of terrorism, allowing further development of revolutionary terrorism in later decades. The arrival of the 1960s oversaw a wave of revolution, brought on by staunch anti-imperialism and opposition to the progression of Civil Rights by the students of America. Following the announcement of intervention in Vietnam, the movement swiftly adopted an anti-war position, re-fuelling their drive for political change. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) would soon form under this New Leftist movement, seeking to ‘model the new, vigorously democratic society i t desired.’ 3 The primary goal of this organisation would be revolution by peaceful protest, as outlined in the Port Huron Statement , drafted in 1962. 4 The manifesto firmly summarises the society’s attitudes against the use of violence in social and political change, whilst also stating the importance of key social institutions being ‘generally organized with the well -being and dignity of man as the essential measure of success.’ 5 As controversial American involvement in Vietnam continued to grow, however, so too would the level of threat and terrorism orchestrated by these young protestors. As tensions in Vietnam increased, radicalisation occurred within the SDS, resulting in a ‘violent faction’ operating under the name the Weathermen. 6 Brenda and James Lutz argue that youth movements were inevitably ‘movements of the weak,’ as a result of their age and inexperience; terrorism would be ‘one of the few 3 Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) p. 22. 4 Students for a Democratic Society, ‘The Port Huron Statement’, 1962 <http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html> [accessed 29 November 2015]. 5 Ibid. 6 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: Americas Experience with Terrorism, Second Edition , 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) p. 3.

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methods […] available to them’ and the chief approach employed by this group. 7 The Weathermen, alternatively known as the Weather Underground and the Weather People, and categorized by Martin Schiff as ‘the vanguard of a unique cultural and political rebellion,’ employed guerrilla tactics to further challenge and campaign against U.S. intervention in Vietnam. 8 Rhetoric of key members, such as Bernadine Dohrn reiterated and reified the methods of protest undertaken, affirming that ‘revolutionary violence is the only way.’ 9 This radicalisation dramatically increased the threat posed by the Weather Underground during the 1960s and 1970s, however they were eager to endorse that the protests and violent action they utilised were merely a tool to represent the objective of the cause, and not to bring harm to innocent American civilians. Whilst present on the American political landscape during the 1960s and 1970s the Weather Underground ‘could claim responsibility for some of the most dramatic events of the time.’ 10 Jeffrey Simon identified that over twenty bombings would be claimed by the Weather Underground between 1970 and 1975 alone, ‘including attacks on the U.S. Capitol and State Department.’ 11 The notable Days of Rage, in October 1969, was the Weather 7 Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, Global Terrorism , 1st edn (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008) p. 157. 8 Martin Schiff, ‘Neo -Transcendentalism in the New Left Counter-Culture: A Vision of the Future Looking Back’, Comparative Studies in Society and History , 15 (1973), p. 57, Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, Global Terrorism , 1st edn (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008) p. 134. 9 Bernadine Dohrn, ‘A Declaration of the State of War’ (The Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1970) <http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/pacificaviet/scheertranscript.html> [accessed 1 December 2015]. 10 Bell and Gurr, p. 335. 11 Simon, p. 3.

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Underground’s ‘first major protest.’ 12 The attack took place on Chicago’s Gold Coast and ‘drew in a few hundred people to an orgy of street violence’ according to James Farrell. 13 Vandalism overran the streets throughout the three-day demonstration, resulting in six members of the Weather Underground being shot, and a further 68 arrested. 14 Jeremy Varon considered the violence experienced during this pivotal event as ‘the great catalyst [that] revealed the importance of militancy for the New Left.’ 15 The following year, and potentially the most crucial incident took place at the University of Wisconsin. Up to this point, the youth movement had been instrumental in ensuring the deaths of them only; this would soon be short lived. 16 On August 24 th , 1970, Sterling Hall at the University of Wisconsin was struck with high explosives late in the evening, later revealing the body of Dr Robert Fassnacht, the first civilian loss of life at the hands of the Weather Underground. 17 The movement could no longer claim to utilise symbolic bombs as their only means of revolution. As such, ‘the virtue of “doing no harm” had vanished.’ 18 Bell and Gurr argue that following this incident, those who ‘sought to demonstrate their affirmation of life and the evil of war, had murdered the innocent,’ and shortly after this event membership would dramatically fall. 19 Even prior to the dramatic rise of terrorist incidents, the FBI, under Director J. Edgar Hoover, had kept the Weather Underground and other anti-war movements under strict scrutiny, utilizing numerous agents to infiltrate the organisations in order to discover and 12 Barry M Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (United States: M.E. Sharpe, 2008) 13 James J. Farrell, The Spirit of the Sixties: The Making of Postwar Radicalism (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1997) p. 197. 14 Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 38. 15 Varon, p. 74-75. 16 Bell and Gurr, p. 336. 17 Ibid, p. 336. 18 Varon, p. 195. 19 Bell and Gurr, p. 336.

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divulge its inner workings and operations. 20 Whilst remaining a key terrorist movement during the 1960s and early 1970s seeking political revolution, in reality the terrorist threat imposed by the Weather Underground was dramatically overstated. As the Vietnam War came to an end, much of the violence and civil disobedience would all but disappear, allowing the introduction of new terrorist threats to arise during the 1970s. 21 Brenda a nd James Lutz argue that in ‘modern times, the use of terrorism by nationalists has often been associated with national liberation struggles against colonial powers.’ 22 Such was the case of Puerto Rican and Croatian Nationalists living in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. These movements would adopt revolutionary terrorism in order to promote the desire for liberation in their homeland. Puerto Rican nationalists adopted anti-colonial protest and terrorism in an attempt to contest American involvement and intervention in their home state. Puerto Rico has been a commonwealth since 1952, allowing ‘some control over its internal affairs’ by the United States. 23 They did not maintain independence as a state, nor were they encompassed officially as a state within North America. This desire for independence and self-sufficiency led to a growing number of revolutionaries within America, where, as Bell 20 Bernard A. Weisberger, ‘The FBI Unbound’, American Heritage , 46 (1995) <http://www.americanheritage.com/content/fbi- unbound?page=show> [accessed 30 November 2015] p. 2. 21 Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Political Protest and Rebellion in the 1960s: The United States in World Perspective’, in Violence in America: Historical & Comparative Perspectives Eisenhower , ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (London: SAGE Publications, 1979), p. 57. 22 Lutz and Lutz, p. 103. 23 Robert Pastor, ‘The International Debate on Puerto Rico: The Costs of Being an Agenda- Taker’, International Organization , 38 (1984), p. 576.

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and Gurr note, ‘media coverage guaranteed them maximum impact.’ 24 Progression in the increased attacks led to the creation of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), a radicalised faction of the separatists that would later undertake a severe terror campaign during the 1970s. 25 It has been identified that around ‘95 per cent of the FALN actions focused on the destruction of property, sabotage and symbolic actions of solidarity with the national liberation movement in Puerto Rico.’ 26 The terrorist threat surrounding this group had been looming since the 1950s. As a result of other political issues surfacing, however, such as initial Cold War tensions and the violent actions of the anti-war movement, it would not be until the 1970s that they would significantly increase their campaign of terror. Although not as prominent, Croatian nationalists also provided a threat of terrorism through domestic anti-colonialism within the United States at this time. The movement itself ‘ linked émigrés from Croatia in several parts of the globe, all of them aiming to free their home from Communist Yugoslavia. ’ 27 Barry and Judith Rubin identify two early examples of terrorism by nationalists in the United States. It would be the Puerto Rican movement that would attempt to assassinate President Harry Truman during a stay at Blair House in 1950, and four years later ‘fire into the House of Representatives from the visitors’ gallery, wounding five congressmen.’ 28 Upon the announcement of FALN in 1974 a swift and destructive attack would fall upon America, seeing five 26 Michael González-Cruz, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando, ‘Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the M acheteros’, Latin American Perspectives , 35 (2008) p. 155. 27 Al Baker, ‘Terrorist’s Release Reopens Wound of Unsolved Bombing’, New York Region (The New York Times, 10 August 2008) <www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all &_r=1&> [accessed 27 November 2015]. 28 Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 105-106. 24 Bell and Gurr, p. 338 25 Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 112.

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individual locations across New York bombed by the organisation due to the economic interests, held by the companies affected, with Puerto Rico. 29 Shortly after this, an equally horrific attack would leave New York City traumatized, as the Fraunces Tavern, a popular lunch spot near Wall Street, was bombed in 1975, leaving four people dead and fifty-five injured. 30 Bell and Gurr state that here, ‘the intent was to kill’ a notion that took the idea of revolutionary terrorism beyond the parameters of political protest, creating a clear and significant threat to the security of the American people. 31 A final, yet conspicuous attack to be noted, is the bombing of La Guardia Airport in 1975, killing an incomprehensible 11 people and injuring a further seventy-five. 32 Al Baker comments in the New York Times , that ‘there were no credible claims of responsibility [and] no arrests were ever made’: He, and many others, have suggested involvement of the Croatian Nationalists due to the prime suspects Croatian heritage, and recent involvement in other New York City bombings. Nevertheless, it remains an ‘“open homicide” case.’ 33 Baker recalls that during the period of 1974-1977, there were ‘49 bombings attributed to the […] Puerto Rican Nationalist group’ FALN, all seeking retribution for unwanted American intervention. 34 Bell and Gurr claim that this ‘shift to armed militancy was the result of frustration with Puerto Rican electoral politics [the] 1976 vote for 29 Michael González-Cruz, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando, ‘Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros’, Latin American Perspectives , 35 (2008) 30 Bell and Gurr, p. 339. 31 Ibid, p. 339. 32 Baker, <www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all &_r=1&> [accessed 27 November 2015] 33 Ibid. 34 Baker, <www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all &_r=1&> [accessed 27 November 2015].

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independence was […] only 6.5 per cent.’ 35 The nationalists passionately ‘waged a sustained campaign of liberation with bombs and bullets,’ but it did not achieve the independence of their homeland. 36 This escalation was truly one of violent and dramatic proportions and as the issue of independence is yet to be resolved, it is an issue that still lies dormant within the American political sphere. Little has occurred following the events of the 1970s, a time in which ‘the United states has viewed Puerto Rico as […] at worst, dangerous subversives and revolutionaries,’ their progressive silence has reduced the threat posed by them to the United States as international threats became more prominent and prevalent. 37 Due to rising tensions in Latin America and the Middle East notions of anti-colonialism grew exponentially on an international level. Terrorism was no longer only a domestic issue for the United States. Various terrorist organisations employed international tactics, such as airline hijackings and hostage-taking, to highlight their cause. ‘Hijackings are not a new phenomenon,’ as Brenda and James Lutz suggest, yet during the 1960s and 1970s they became a key tool in the arsenal of terrorists. 38 The use of airline hijackings would significantly increase during the period 1968-1972 under the necessities of two typographies as identified by Robert Holden; transportation hijackings, and hijackings for extortion. 39 Transportation hijackings were significantly employed by Cuban exiles in the wake of the Cuban revolution, as a means of returning to

35 Bell and Gurr, p. 338. 36 Ibid, p. 338.

37 Pedro A. Malavet, America’s Colony: The Political and Cultural Conflict between the United States and Puerto Rico (New York: New York University Press, 2004) p. 147. 38 Lutz and Lutz, p. 26. 39 Ro bert T Holden, ‘The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking’, American Journal of Sociology , 91 (1986), p. 874-879.

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their home country, initially forbidden by the State Department. 40 In 1968 alone, Holden remarks, nineteen hijackings of ‘domestic U.S. flights’ landed in Cuba. 41 In the wake of Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ‘consciously adopted terrorism as the centrepiece of its strategy.’ 42 They would utilise hijackings as a means of extortion, allowing the release of hostages in exchange for the release of imprisoned comrades. On September 6, 1970, the PFLP hijacked four consecutive airlines – including two jets from Trans World Airlines and Pan America: the planes were flown to Dawson’s Field in Jordan, where they were destroyed following the disembarking of passengers and crew. 43 All passengers and crew were released in exchange for a small number of Palestinians highlighting the effectiveness of the deed, particularly under such heavy media scrutiny. As a continuation of hijacking attempts, Middle Eastern terror cells adopted the tactic of hostage taking, in order to stir media attention and promote their cause; subsequently there are two key hostage situations that haunt the 1960s and 1970s. During the Munich Olympics in 1972, Black September terrorists (a faction of the PLO) stormed the Olympic village, where they took nine Israeli athletes hostage and killed a further two, demanding the release of ‘over two hundred Arabs jailed in Israel.’ 44 The outcome of this attack was a ‘colossal failure’ in terms of the hostage situation and the attempt to rescue the captives, Bruce Hoffman contends. 45 No Israeli athletes survived and no Arab prisoners were released. Hoffman later adds, however: 40 Holden, p. 880-882. 41 Ibid, p. 881. 42 Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 176. 43 Ibid, p. 187. 44 Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 188. 45 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) p. 68.

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The real lesson of Munich […] was counterintuitive [providing] the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks that fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the attention of the media. 46 This incident was arguably the ‘ideal forum to publicize the Palestinian cause’ and the media responded in full swing. 47 The second, and possibly most significant hostage situation took place at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, in which sixty-three American hostages were held by supposed student demonstrators. 48 It could be debated that these situations ‘provide an indication of the strength of the dissidents and the weaknesses of the government’ depending on the rapidity and successfulness of the response, an area in which President Jimmy Carter failed. 49 The disastrous rescue mission that ‘killed eight American servicemen’ and the inability to successfully negotiate the return of the hostages, disillusioned th e people of America, highlighting Carter’s weakness as a leader and effectively ending his administration. 50 The significant media involvement of the increasing hijacking and hostage situations, during the 1960s and 1970s, would compel a response to address the global pandemic that is international terrorism from Washington. In the years prior to this point in history, presidents had been hesitant to address the issue of terrorism publicly, whether a result of pressing need in other areas of concern or a consciousness to subdue levels of fear and uncertainty among the American people. This was certainly the case with the earlier threats discussed. It could be argued,

46 Hoffman, p. 69. 47 Lutz and Lutz, p. 123.

48 Carol K Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era (Albany: State University of New

York Press, 2006) p. 37. 49 Lutz and Lutz, p. 27. 50 Winkler, p. 38-50.

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however, that it has become increasingly convoluted to avoid public addresses of terrorism in recent years due to the ‘tremendous growth of the mass media’ following international terrorist developments, subsequently thrusting the issue to the forefront of every presidents political agenda. 51 President Richard Nixon would be the first American l eader to officially address ‘inhuman wave of terrorism’ as a key threat haunting these decades, in his ‘Action to Combat Terrorism’ speech of 1972. 52 Nixon would bring the issue to the frontline of political thinking and security by claiming the ‘time has come for civilized people to act in concert to remove the threat of terrorism from the world.’ 53 It would be the presidency of Jimmy Carter, a victim of his decisions and insecurities, which would end in such catastrophic disappointment following the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, and therefore directly a result of terrorism. His inconsistency in naming the suspects as hostage takers offers a prime example, Carol Winkler suggests, of Carter’s hesitancy during this time and as such his ineffectiveness. 54 Jeffrey Simon notes that this incident would ‘virtually paralyze his presidency’, with any opportunities to salvage his legitimacy as America’s leader lost following the failed rescue mission. 55 At this point international terrorism would reach a critical point in development, with a prevalent need for action and a ‘warrant for immediate international condemnation […] against such behaviour in the future.’ 56 As Bruce Hoffman notes, ‘anticolonial terrorism campaigns are critical to understanding the evolution and development of modern 51 Simon, p. 10. 52 Richard Nixon, ‘Action to Combat Terrorism’, 1972 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602> [accessed 30 November 2015]. 53 Nixon, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602> [accessed 30

November 2015]. 54 Winkler, p. 39. 55 Simon, p.8. 56 Winkler, p. 44-45.

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contemporary terrorism.’ 57 Throughout the decades in discussion, anticolonial terrorism has been rife within America; it is the transition from a domestic level, as portrayed through the terrorist campaigns of the Puerto Rican separatists, to an international level of anticolonial terrorism, demonstrated in the use of hijackings and hostage taking situations, that re-enforces the developments addressed by Hoffman, initiating forms of terrorism that we are more familiar with today. As a consequence of involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars, the United States would find itself facing numerous enemy states that sought to fight against imperialism throughout the Middle East, in later years. 58 Palestinian journalist Saqr Abu Fakhr, discusses the threat of a ‘new barbarism’ in an article for al-Hayat al-Jahida ; ‘the American barbarism committed by the United States in the name of international legitimacy.’ 59 Attitudes such as these, along with knowledge and understanding of these international terrorist tactics, triggered a development of rogue states across the Middle East provoking anti- American sentiments that continues to develop, in threat and volume of support, to present day. In conclusion, the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, although not necessarily prominent in historical knowledge, emphatically shaped the future of terrorism through the incidents highlighted. Each provided a crucial threat of terror, rendering the legacy of these decades as one of transformation ‘from a primarily localised phenomenon into a security problem of global proportions. 60 The Youth Movement and its subsequent factions formed and 57 Hoffman, p. 62. 58 A Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 93 59 Saqr Abu Fakhr, ‘The New Barbarism’, 1998, cited in Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin edn, Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 129. 60 Hoffman, p. 62.

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disbanded during these decades, wreaking terror on the streets of the United States and highlighting the power and potential of a united front seeking to revolutionise what they believed to be a cruel and imperial regime. The domestic anti-colonialism as enacted by the Puerto Rican and Croatian Nationalists sought violence as a means of liberation, readily prepared to kill for the cause, whilst a remaining threat to some extent the movement itself has sat dormant for many years now. The transition to international anti-colonialism, through the use of hijackings and hostage taking, and the rise of Middle Eastern dissidents, would outlive these decades. The global reaction and presidential responses that followed provided inspiration for future terror cells and developed anti-American sentiments within the region, provoking future attacks including the fateful day of September 11 th , 2001. Revolutionary terrorism was itself revolutionised, and so the nature of terrorism would be forever changed.

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Bibliography Baker, Al, ‘Terrorist’s Release Reopens Wound of Unsolved Bombing’, New York Region (The New York Times, 10 August 2008) <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html? pagewanted=all&_r=1&> [accessed 27 November 2015]. Bell, J. Bowyer, and Te d Robert Gurr, ‘Terrorism and Revolution in America’, in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives , ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (United States: SAGE Publications, 1979), pp. 329 – 47. Dohrn, Bernadine, ‘A Declaration of the State of War’ (The Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1970) <http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/pacificaviet/scheertranscript.h tml> [accessed 1 December 2015]. Farrell, James J., The Spirit of the Sixties: The Making of Postwar Radicalism (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1997). González-Cruz, Michael, Alberto Marquez Sola, and Lorena Terando, ‘Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros’, Latin American Perspectives , 35 (2008), 151 – 65. Gurr, Ted Robert, ‘Political Pr otest and Rebellion in the 1960s: The United States in World Perspective’, in Violence in America: Historical & Comparative Perspectives Eisenhower , ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (London: SAGE Publications, 1979), pp. 49 – 75. Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

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Holden, Robert T, ‘The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking’, American Journal of Sociology , 91 (1986), 874 – 904. Lutz, Brenda J., and James M. Lutz, Global Terrorism , 1st edn (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008). Malavet, Pedro A., America’s Colony: The Political and Cultural Conflict between the United States and Puerto Rico (New York: New York University Press, 2004). New York University, ‘An Introduction: SDS’, by New York University <http://www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/collections/exhibits/arch/Whos who/SDS.html> [accessed 1 December 2015]. Nixon, Richard, ‘Action to Combat Terrorism’, 1972 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602> [accessed 30 November 2015]. Onwudiwe, Ihekwoaga, The Globalization of Terrorism (Interdisciplinary Research Series in Ethnic, Gender And) (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000). Pastor, Robert, ‘The International Debate on Puerto Rico: The Costs of Being an Agenda- Taker’, International Organization , 38 (1984), 575 – 95. Rubin, Barry M, and Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Rubin, Barry M, and Judith Colp Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (United States: M.E. Sharpe, 2008).

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Schiff, Martin, ‘Neo -Transcendentalism in the New Left Counter- Culture: A Vision of the Future Looking Back’, Comparative Studies in Society and History , 15 (1973), 130 – 42. Simon, Jeffrey D., The Terrorist Trap: Americas Experience with Terrorism, Second Edition , 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). Students for a Democratic Society, ‘The Port Huron Statement’, 1962 <http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html> [accessed 29 November 2015]. Varon, Jeremy, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Weisberger, Bernard A, ‘The FBI Unbound’, American Heritage , 46 (1995) <http://www.americanheritage.com/content/fbi- unbound?page=show> [accessed 30 November 2015]. Winkler, Carol K, In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

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To what extent (if any) did European colonizers of Australia engage in conscious campaigns of genocide against Australia’s indigenous inhabitants? Camilla de Paula-Yarmohammadi – PO-256 In this essay I will be looking into the European colonisation of Australia and exploring whether or not these colonisers committed conscious campaigns of genocide against the indigenous inhabitants of Australia, with focus on the British colonisers of Australia. I will provide an account of the colonisation of Australia along with exploring the idea of cultural genocide and Australia’s Stolen Generations. In order to reach a conclusion to the question I will draw upon articles and journals and I will look into the definitions of genocide. Prior to my research, I strongly believed that the European colonisers of Australia did in fact engage in conscious campaigns of genocide against indigenous Australians. I believed that the conscious genocide committed by these colonisers was primarily cultural genocide, due to the Euro pean colonisers’ desire to forcibly remove indigenous children from their homes. Defining Genocide Genocide was a term coined in 1945 by Jewish-Polish Lawyer Raphael Lemkin following the Holocaust where only Lemkin and his brother survived and the rest of his family were murdered. He combined the words ‘genos’, that means race or tribe in Greek, and ‘cide’, which means ‘to kill’ in Latin. In 1948, following campaigning from Lemkin, the UN Convention of Genocide was adopted and came into effect in 1951. Under this convention, genocide is described as being ‘"any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such": Killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group

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conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’ 61 If genocide takes place in a country it is the duty of the country to punish the perpetrators and prevent genocide from taking place. However, despite the adoption of the UN Convention of Genocide, many have criticised the convention claiming that the convention is very limited meaning that none of the mass killings committed since the convention was put in place can be classified as genocide. Common criticisms include; the convention excludes targeted political and social groups, the definition of genocide limits itself to direct acts against people and therefore excludes acts against the environment which sustains them or their cultural distinctiveness, it can be challenging to prove the intention of committing genocide, members of the UN are often hesitant to single out other members or intervene, and it is often difficult to stipulate how many deaths equate to a genocide. 62 What is cultural genocide? When Lemkin coined the term genocide, he described eight dimensions to the term; political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral. Each dimension targeted a different aspect of a group’s existence. Out of all these dimensions, physical, biological and cultural genocide are the most recognised. Physical genocide refers to the physical annihilation of a group by killing and injuring its members. Biological genocide refers to measures that are put in place in order to limit the reproductive

61 BBC, " How Do You Define Genocide? ", BBC News, 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11108059> [accessed 26 April 2016]. 62 BBC

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capacity of a group through involuntary sterilization or through the forced segregation of sexes. 63 Cultural genocide goes much further than the biological and physical elements of a group; it seeks instead to eliminate fundamental aspects of a group. Often this is done through the abolition of the g roup’s native language, applying restrictions to certain traditional and cultural practices, the destruction of religious institutions and objects that are significant to the targeted group, the persecution and attacks on clergy members and academics. Along with this, elements of cultural genocide include the restriction and prohibition of artistic, literary and cultural activities, along with the destruction and confiscation of national treasures, libraries, archives, museums, artefacts and art galleries. 64 In the 1948 convention there is mention of physical and biological genocide, however cultural genocide oddly is not. In earlier drafts of the Genocide Convention however, cultural genocide was included and prohibited under the convention but as the treaty neared finalisation questions arose surrounding the relevance of cultural genocide. It was argued that cultural genocide lacked logic and proportion, stating that “to include in the same convention both mass murders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries” did not make much sense. Despite this however some still agreed with Lemkin’s broader definitions of genocide, agreeing that an attack on cultural institutions can be detrimental to a group without an attack on physical and biological aspects of the group. 65

63 David Nersessian, "Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law", Carnegiecouncil.org, 2005 <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/sectio n_1/5139.html/:pf_printable> [accessed 27 April 2016]

64 David Nersessian 65 David Nersessian

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In the finalised convention, cultural genocide was largely ignored except for a part in which it states that it is prohibited to forcibly remove children from a group and place them in another. It was strongly acknowledged that the removal of children was fundamentally destructive, both physically and biologically. They also recognised that attempting to impose customs, language and values of a foreign group upon children was “tantamount to the destruction of the [child’s] group, whose future depended on that next generation.” 66 What happened to the Indigenous in Australia? When British colonists entered Australia in 1788, the indigenous population had had almost no previous outside contact. They were met with hostility from the British who forced the indigenous out of their homes, attacked them regularly, poisoned or shot them, and confined them to the most inhabitable areas of Australia. In the 120 years that followed the actions of the British colonisers led the indigenous population to near extinction. 67 In 1871-72 Anthony Trollope, a novelist visited the British colonies in Australia. He declared the indigenous population was ‘incredibly savage’ and doomed to extinction. Unfortunately , his prediction did come true in part when the ‘full blood’ Tasmanians died out. In the late 19 th century the indigenous population was plummeting with many British colonisers claiming that the co- called ‘lower races’ were simply unable to withstand ‘civilisation’, much like the unfortunate indigenous inhabitants of the Americas before them. Despite being extremely violent towards the Indigenous Australians, British colonists and British Australians were adamant to blame disease and dislocation in an attempt to free them of any blame associated with the 66 David Nersessian 67 Brett Stone, " Report Details Crimes against Aborigines - World Socialist Web Site ", Wsws.org, 1999 <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/09/geno-s07.html> [accessed 28 April 2016].

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strong decline in the indigenous population. The indigenous population was declared a ‘dying race’ by anthropologists, who claimed that the best they could do was to segregate the indigenous in reserves where they would be protected from exploitation. 68 Following the segregation of the indigenous population, British colonisers systematically removed indigenous children, particularly those with mixed parentage from their families, placing them in institutions or with white parents, in an attempt to raise them as lower class white children. These children were referred to as the Stolen Generations and these acts continued well into the 20 th century. As outlined in the introduction to the essay, I will focus on the cultural genocide that took place in Australia. The Stolen Generations and cultural genocide Between 1910 and 1970, thousands of indigenous Australian children were forcibly removed from their families as a result of various government policies, in particular the 1897 Aboriginal Act. The trauma faced by many indigenous families during this time continues to affect many communities, families and individuals. The idea of forcibly removing indigenous children from their families followed the ideology of Assimilation. Assimilation was an ideology founded on the assumption of black inferiority and white superiority, which proposed that the indigenous population should be allowed to ‘die out’ through a process of natural elimination or where possible they should be assimilated into white society. 69 68 Dirk Moses, Genocide and Holocaust Consciousness in Australia , 1st edn (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2016), pp. 1-2 <http://www.dirkmoses.com/uploads/7/3/8/2/7382125/moses_genholoconsau stralia.pdf> [accessed 28 April 2016]. 69 Australianstogether.org, "The Stolen Generations ", Australians Together, 2016 <http://www.australianstogether.org.au/stories/detail/the-stolen- generations> [accessed 29 April 2016].

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Once removed from their parents the indigenous children were instructed to reject their indigenous heritage and were made to adapt themselves to white culture. Along with this their names were changed and they were forbidden to speak their traditional language. Despite some children being adopted by white families, many were placed in institutions where they were abused and neglected. The process of Assimilation focused primarily on children whom authorities considered to be more adaptable into white society rather than indigenous adults. Children of mixed white and indigenous parentage were the biggest targets for removal as their lighter skin meant that they could be more efficiently integrated into the white community. 70 When child removal policies were put in place white Australians believed that they would be improving the lives of indigenous Australians by helping them integrate themselves into white society, however this was not the case and indigenous Australians were (and still are) marginalised. They were rejected by society as they refused to accept indigenous people as equals despite their efforts to suppress their culture and race. 71 Despite the practice of the ideology of Assimilation happening before the 1948 Genocide Convention, the removal of indigenous children from their parents continued far beyond the passing of the convention, and despite the exclusion of cultural genocide in the final draft of the Genocide Convention, as mentioned previously there is a part that states: ‘Forcible transfer of childre n, imposed by direct force or through fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or other methods of coercion’ is considered to be an act of Genocide, along with evidence of the ‘widespread and/or systematic discriminatory and targeted practices culminating in gross violations of human rights of protected groups, such as

70 Australianstogether.org 71 Australianstogether.org

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extrajudicial killings, torture and displacement’. 72 Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and there is evidence of their displacement, and many testimonials given by the Stolen Generations have proven this. If the accounts of the indigenous victims are accurate then there is evidence that the European colonisers of Australia did indeed commit conscious acts of genocide, that fall under Lemkin’s cate gory of cultural genocide. These testimonials however have been scrutinised and their validity has been questioned, notably by conservative critics Ron Brunton and Paddy McGuiness whom have characterised Stolen Generations testimonies as exemplifying ‘false memory syndrome’, suggesting that victims have created memories of removal that are being accepted in a sympathetic political and cultural climate. 73 Keith Windschuttle also rejects the idea of Stolen Generations claiming that ‘in the… 20th century, there was no… statement by anyone in genuine authority that child removal was intended to end Aboriginality. The only support for that proposition has come from… selected statements taken out of context by politically motivated historians’, claiming instead th at the removal of indigenous children from their parents in the 20 th century was ‘almost all based on traditional grounds of child welfare.’ 74 This can perhaps be true as ‘false memory syndrome’ can affect early memories and since many indigenous children were removed at a very young age it could be that 72 UN, “ Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (Osapg)”, 1st edn (UN, 2016), p. 3 <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framew ork.pdf> [accessed 29 April 2016]. 73 Ann Curthoys et al, Aboriginal History , 1st edn (Canberra: ANU Printing, 2001), p. 116 <http://press- files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p72971/pdf/book.pdf?referer=1063> [accessed 29 April 2016]. 74 Keith Windschuttle, "There Were No Stolen Generations", The Spectator, 2009 <http://www.spectator.co.uk/2009/12/there-were-no-stolen- generations/> [accessed 30 April 2016].

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their memories of that time were clouded, for example, child psychologist Jean Piaget gave an account of his own false memory. He recalled that there had been an attempt to kidnap him when he was young. He recalled seeing his nanny fight off the kidnapper followed by an officer who chased the kidnapper away. Piaget swore it happened however his nanny revealed that she had made the story up. Piaget wrote: "I therefore must have heard, as a child the account of this story...and projected it into the past in the form of a visual memory, which was a memory of a memory, but false." 75 Despite the accusation of ‘false memory syndrome’ being a very valid one indeed, it can be argued that it is very difficult for such a large group of individuals to all be suffering from the same condition. The accounts of the Stolen Generations can perhaps be confirmed by taking a better look at the Aborigines Protection Act, in 1909, the act gave the Aborigines Protection Board legal permission to remove Indigenous children from their families. In 1915, the act was amended; this meant that the Board was able to legally remove any indigenous child from its parents without parental consent or a court order. Poor record keeping meant that it is not known exactly how many indigenous children were taken, which also means that it is almost impossible to find solid evidence to support the cultural genocide that took place in Australia apart from testimonials. 76 On February 13 th 2008, Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd, made a formal apology to the indigenous population of Australia and in particular to the Stolen Generations. He said ‘we apologise … for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country.’ The 75 FMS, "False Memory Syndrome Foundation", Fmsfonline.org, 2013 <http://www.fmsfonline.org/?ginterest=CreatingFalseMemories> [accessed 30 April 2016]. 76 Racismnoway, " The Stolen Generations | Fact Sheet ", Racismnoway.com.au, 2016 <http://www.racismnoway.com.au/teaching- resources/factsheets/52.html> [accessed 30 April 2016].

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evidence presented that lead to the apology was published in a report called Bringing Them Home. In the report there was evidence presented through the accounts of over 500 victims and hundreds of letters presenting eye witness accounts and testimonies. The scale of testimonies itself is a clear indication that the Stolen Generations did in fact happen and the official apology backed up this evidence. 77 The amendment of the Aborigines Protection Act and the official apology are the only acceptable forms of official evidence of intent to commit genocide against the indigenous population of Australia. It is evident through the testimonials given by the Stolen Generations that they were indeed taken from their families with intent and against their will and placed elsewhere, along with being banned from speaking their native language which under the 1948 Genocide Convention, as I previously outlined, constitutes as an act of genocide. On the other hand however, there is a lack of evidence surrounding the aims of the colonisers and a lack of evidence outlining the intent of the colonisers to commit acts of genocide against the indigenous population. Despite the official apology for the acts committed by colonisers, there is no evidence suggesting that the removal and displacement of indigenous children was in fact an act of ethnical cleansing or if they were, as Keith Windschuttle claimed, merely an enforcement of traditional child welfare laws. However the lack of records surrounding the removal of children possibly hints towards cruel intentions as it can be seen as a ‘cover up’ which is not uncommon throughout history, most notably the rush by guilty Nazi’s to destroy concentration camps during WW2. It must be remembered that in order for an act to be considered genocide it must be proved that the perpetrator had intent to commit the act of genocide. This can be extremely upsetting for people who believe they were victims of 77 NMA, " National Museum Of Australia - National Apology ", Nma.gov.au, 2016 <http://www.nma.gov.au/online_features/defining_moments/featured/nationa l_apology> [accessed 1 May 2016].

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genocide. The accounts provided by the Stolen Generations outlines the emotional and mental scars that have affected them throughout their lives, and although I believe that cultural genocide was committed in the sense that indigenous children had their cultural identities taken from them there is no official evidence outlining that the colonisers intended to suppress and eliminate their indigenous culture. Due to the lack of evidence outlining the intent of the colonisers to commit conscious campaigns of genocide, I will conclude that conscious campaigns of genocide were not committed against the indigenous population of Australia, my thesis was therefore disproved.

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