impossible with such few numbers, and for the defended stretches the lines were thin so reserves could be kept back for counter-attack. Preventing the initial landing and beach success was naturally implausible in the face of such numerical inferiority. Instead, the beach fortifications and extensive sea mine preparations were meant to delay and impede the invading forces to give German reserves crucial time to respond to the invasion. 5 The Germans were forced into this reactive strategy because of the poor quality of German intelligence regarding invasion sites. While it was clear that the build-up of forces in England meant that France would be the target, Blumentritt argued that the lack of exact German intelligence forced the generals to rely upon their own judgement concerning where. 6 Hitler’s short-sighted preoccupation with fortified ports may have diverted critical resources from an already stretched thin army, but the poor quality of intelligence enabled this diversion by forcing the leadership to rely on speculation. This inability to concentrate forces resulted in the Germans being unable to alleviate their overall strategic numerical inferiority with a tactical superiority at a landing site. While Hastings acknowledges how handicapped the German leadership was without proper intelligence, he blames Hitler for exacerbating this issue. By constantly restraining and acting against the intuition and military expertise of his commanders, the German response could not fulfil its potential. 7 A notable example being how Rommel accurately predicted Normandy as the landing sector, yet Hitler refused to heed his requests for repositioned forces. 8 The stifling German chain of command is most famously exemplified in how Rommel felt forced to return to Germany in order to attempt to convince Hitler in person, a grievous error considering his departure unfortunately coincided with the D-Day invasion and thus resulted in an absence of operational leadership. 9 Requiring Hitler’s agreement for defensive preparations was a limiting factor before D-Day, but it was disastrous once Overlord commenced. His determination that Normandy was a diversionary landing stands as both testament for the ingenuity and effectiveness of Operation Fortitude, and as an example of how debilitating depending on the decisions of a faraway and blind commander could be. 10 Hitler's lack of command delegation and real faith in his tested and experienced commanders diminished the physical military response.
5 Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers , ed. By Basil Henry Liddell-Hart and Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1953), p. 460. 6 Liddell-Hart, p. 146.
7 Hastings, p. 223. 8 Rommel, p. 475. 9 Rommel, p. 474. 10 Liddell-Hart, p. 180.
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