Volume V (2022) (2015)
This change in the concept of identity defends it from the criticisms proposed by Buckareff and Wagenen. As mentioned in their earlier example Charles at time t 1 before being transferred into a body belonging to an autistic person is Charles, and Charles at t 2 after the transfer is also
Charles — th ey are temporal parts of the entity “Charles” at different times. However, considering
identity as a perduring entity puts forth another problem: what binds those temporal parts together?
For example, if temporal parts can have different first-person perspectives, then one can make the
argument that every identity that exists is a temporal part of one single “Identity”— all identities are
manifestations of one entity. Using the previous example of an apple as a perduring entity, the
spatial part of the apple that is its body can serve as the binding object of different temporal parts of
that apple. As long as the apple that is going through time shares the same spatial part, i.e., its
physical body, it can be considered parts of the same “apple,” and not a di fferent one. However,
this idea of the physical body being the binding entity does not translate in the same way for a
person, making it difficult to conceive of a binding entity that is different for different individuals.
Consider the following thought experiment: as AI advances, it becomes possible to upload a
person’s consciousness, awareness, first -person perspective, behavior, or psyche, into a robot that
can fully operate as a human body. This example is similar to Buckareff and Wagenen’s example
of a miraculous transfer of the body. There is a change in the body, but it is difficult to confirm
with certainty if the change in the body makes the person entirely different in the sense that the
person is not part of the previous temporal parts and becom es a whole new entity. If Baker’s
argument is taken seriously, in terms of the body not constituting identity and first-person
perspective being the key concept to understanding identity, it is reasonable to consider first-person
perspective being more feasible as a binding entity for identity than a body.
Another philosopher who appears to have the same understanding of human consciousness is Edmund Husserl. Husserl believes “consciousness extends through time itself.” 23 There are
several arguments he puts forth in The Phenomenology of Internal-time Consciousness , but one of
the most relevant arguments, in the context of this paper, is his explanation for the continuity of
consciousness in time. As Michael Kelly states,
To explain how consciousness extends beyond the now in its act of perception, Husserl begins to think that consciousness itself must have a “width.” And this is just to say that consciousness must have a sense of the past and a sense of the future, to begin with. To this end, Husserl attempts to argue that consciousness extends to capture past moments of
23 Barry Dainton, “Temporal Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, June 28, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/.
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