// MILITARY SECURITY: RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND EUROPE
F oreign relations, unlike domes- Trump’s return to power, however, geo- politics have become far more deeply unpredictable, compressing major changes from years to months, weeks and, sometimes, even days. Political, mil- itary and trade disruptions now are so consequential that the best way to try to understand issues and solutions, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, is to return to first principles. Although military and economic help from G7 members has been critical in pre- serving the independence of over 80% of Ukraine, some governments have tried to separate soft from hard power, preening the former and neglecting the latter. Soft power can only be effective if it is backed by commensurate hard power, whose central component is defence. Whereas in democ- racies defence expenditures must satisfy legitimate competing interests, G7 mem- tic issues, normally operate along a long arc. Since US president Donald bers also face unpredictable American leadership plus persistent Russian aggres- sion in Europe and assertiveness globally. They need to confront both an inconven- ient reality and a short window to address these threats and stresses effectively. Dras- tically increasing defence spending, then, is not a luxury; it is an exigency. The United States remains the indis- pensable partner, providing extended nuclear deterrence and crucial logistical
As US leadership grows more unpredictable, and as Russian aggression persists, the imperative to safeguard Ukraine has never been more urgent. G7 members must commit to significantly increase defence spending, standing united for Ukraine and the stability of the global order Holding the line: Why Ukraine’s defence matters to us all
Aurel Braun, professor of international relations and political science, University of Toronto
26 // G7 CANADA: THE KANANASKIS SUMMIT 2025
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