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. why-their-new-comprehensive-strategic-partnership- matters/#:~:text=The%20reports%20of%20a%20possible,next%20to%20an%20oil%20re nery ↑ 51. Michaël Tanchum, “China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in- africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/ ↑ 52. Lorenzo Suadoni, “The Discreet Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies: Implications for Africa,” Atlas Institute of International A airs, November 30, 2025, https://atlasinstitute.org/the-discreet-rise-of- . chinese-private-security-companies-implications-for- africa/#:~:text=Estimates%20suggest%20that%2020%20to,(Carnegie%20Endowment%2C%202020) ↑ 53. Chen Qingqing, “China-Africa security forum injects positive energy into global peace” ↑ 54. “China’s Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates E orts to Rebalance Trade,” China-Global South Project, February 9, 2026, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/the-2025-china-africa-trade- rundown/ ↑ 55. Fabrizio Minniti, “China’s in uence in Africa: Challenges and strategic implications,” NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy, n.d., https://nrdc-ita.nato.int/newsroom/insights/chinas-in uence-in-africa- challenges-and-strategic-implications ↑ 56. “China’s Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates E orts to Rebalance Trade.” ↑ 57. and , “Chinese Engagement with Africa: a RAND Research Primer,” RAND, July 15, 2025, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo Cortez A. Cooper III https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2989-1.html ↑
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