Open borders
the same rationale not extend beyond borders? Every reason one might have for moving within a country, such as seeking safety, livelihood or fulfilment, applies also to movement across countries. The difference between the two is one of convention, not of moral substance. Unless one can provide compelling rationale for why either a) freedom of internal movement should not be considered a human right or b) there is an arbitrary line where the extension of this right must stop for moral reason, it should be analogous to extend this right beyond borders, not constrained within them. Thus, the same democratic principles that justify freedom of movement within borders necessarily extends beyond said borders. I adopt here a form of reasoning that follows Joseph Carens’ extension of liberal egalitarian principles beyond the state, 5 an argument coined by David Miller as the ‘cantilever strategy’. 6 Even though freedom of movement is considered a basic human right in major human rights documents, it is nonetheless of significance to defend its moral basis. Presently, limitations of a citizen’s ability to exercise their freedom of movement either take the form of rather non-inhibitive regulations like property and traffic laws which only regulate how this freedom is exercised (rather than negate it) or proportionate and morally justified limitations, such as containing infectious diseases or restricting movement of those under arrest, which are in line with Mill’s ‘harm principle’. Within democratic states, this right applies universally to all citizens, independent of merit or circumstance, reflecting the commitment that equality of moral worth overrides inherited status. More notable, however, is the fact that political authorities are not entitled to force nor prohibit one from exercising this right for reasons of convenience, economic protectionism or social order alone, giving the individual absolute autonomy over their actions. Some may question whether freedom of internal movement truly warrants the status of a fundamental human right. Utilitarian ethicists may claim that unrestricted movement could produce harmful consequences, such as economic imbalances and uncontrolled urbanization, that therefore justify curtailment of this freedom. And to an extent, this is true. In fact, the People’s Republic of China implemented the ‘hukou system’ to combat these very effects. Free movement was considered to be dangerous, as it had the potential to lead to overpopulation of cities and threaten agricultural production. 7 However, this objection misses the fundamental nature of human rights. The utilitarian approach, naturally, takes a pragmatic approach but this bears no significance, as the moral validity does not depend upon its utility or contribution to collective order, but in its role in securing individual liberty, autonomy and self-determination. Such objections may legitimately guide an approach on certain regulations, such as in the case of traffic or property laws, but do not negate the underlying moral claim that individuals, by virtue of their equal moral worth, deserve the right to self- determination.
Secondly, some may argue that human rights cannot be idiosyncratic, and must pertain to generic or vital interests. Furthermore, in a similar vein, if most people do not wish to exercise their right to
5 Carens, J. (1987). Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders. The Review of Politics , 49 (2), 251–273. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407506 . 6 Miller, D. (2016). 'Is there a Human Right to Immigrate?' In S. Fine & L. Ypi (eds.) Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership. Oxford. 7 Young, J. (2013). China's Hukou system: Markets, migrants and institutional change. 10.1057/9781137277312.
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