Open borders
freedom of movement, how can it be a fundamental human right? This fails as autonomy is dependent upon one’s capacity to change one’s circumstances and therefore access to opportunities. One cannot meaningfully pursue opportunities desirable to one while confined spatially and socially. As shown earlier, autonomy follows on from democratic principles, and as such should be upheld by democratic states. Additionally, we should be offended by the implied premise that freedom of movement does not protect ‘vital’ human interests. Freedom of movement is a prerequisite for autonomy because it allows individuals to access opportunities and shape their own lives. As Oberman notes, we have a basic interest in being ‘free to access the full range of existing life options’, 8 which underscores why such mobility is morally significant, even if not everyone exercises it. Consider refugees fleeing persecution or individuals relocating for subsistence due to crop failure. While this does not apply to every human currently, the potential for these circumstances to apply to one certainly does. The fact that not everyone chooses to exercise this right does not make it non-generic, as a right protects the capacity to act, not merely the act itself. This potentiality is key: even if most do not move, the capability to do so safeguards autonomy and access to opportunities if and when circumstances demand it. This could be likened to the right to a fair trial, which is indispensable for safety and security yet will not apply directly to the broad majority of people and is in fact beneficial to this group, simply in the knowledge that such a right exists. In establishing the moral validity of internal freedom of movement, we must turn to the second part of the argument which is particularly relevant to the support of open borders. The same principles (equality, autonomy and right to self-determination) that support the right to internal freedom of movement can be applied equally to freedom of movement across states. The moral rationale justifying internal freedom of movement does not rely upon borders or citizenship. Accordingly, restricting movement across borders arbitrarily limits the abilities of individuals to exercise their freedom and autonomy without providing a morally relevant difference. It is important to note that open borders do not create new harmful consequences that internal migration does not already present. Just as domestic mobility is morally protected to prevent the constraint of opportunity and self-direction, so too can international mobility be morally recognized, as it enables individuals to act upon their capacities in pursuit of life circumstances they cannot achieve within the limits of their state of birth. Therefore, in the interest of consistency, democratic states are morally obliged to open their borders, as the same principles that justify internal freedom of movement apply equally at the international level. Some critics may claim that the practical consequences of open borders, namely, the destabilization of economies, social and cultural division, the overwhelming of social services, are not products of internal migration. Firstly, internal mobility is not completely free from economic consequences, e.g. local job competition, housing shortages, agricultural deficits. If it were the case that internal freedom of movement did not have certain disadvantages, then there would be no need for it to be a human right, as it could be left to the discretion of the state. The moral claim for open borders concerns rights and autonomy, not pragmatism. These concerns are contingent, not fundamental moral reasons. Carens’ feudalism analogy shows that major societal and economic benefits often require long-term moral and structural change. At present, it is not feasible to realize such a societal overhaul with immediate effect; instead it is important to use these concerns to guide policies that mitigate risk, not deny fundamental
8 Oberman, K. 2016 ‘Immigration as a Human Right’, in Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership , edited by S. Fine and L. Ypi: 3–32. Oxford.
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