Immigration (part 2)
is granted entry to State B. 7 However, we do not allow that they should have the right of entry into another State C or D, given their right to exit was contingent on the inhospitable qualities of A, and have already been provided with suitable alternative B.
In establishing this duty and the clear justification for cultural grounds of a right to exclude, what are some of the extremer cases where a state should exercise this right and deny immigration? Joseph Carens, the arch-cosmopolitan of immigration ethics, argues from a distributive justice standpoint that closed borders deny people access to resources and equal opportunity. 8 While we can acknowledge the moral vigour of Carens’ position, it remains absolutist and hardly practical. Furthermore, Carens fails to evaluate the moral value of public culture and the agency of political communities. To take an example of when a right to exclude should be exercised, consider a democratic state facing substantial immigration from a people who formerly lived under an autocratic or theocratic regime. If this immigration was credibly aimed at subverting liberal-democratic institutions, a fundamental part of the state’s culture, it would be morally justified to deny their entry. Another example to demonstrate a justified exclusion would be in a post-conflict society such as Rwanda in the 1990s or Bosnia in the 2000s. A genocide or civil war requires the rebuilding of civic identity. Therefore, imposing short-term immigration controls to reconstruct shared norms and restore cultural confidence is justifiable. It is clear that culture can be a reason to deny entry in specific cases. Open borders, and a failure to control borders, have catalysed an emergence of right-wing groups whose political agenda is focalized around rectifying supposed acculturation. The sole realistic policy that ensures human rights are respected, culture remains protected, and a unifying hegemonic culture develops in states accepting immigrants is a rarely used right to exclude, reserved for extreme cases, some of which are offered above. Ironically, the many western European nations who defined themselves through empire are often the ones who protest the most at accepting immigrants. A discussion about cultural reparations is beyond the scope of this essay, but the culture of many western nations is founded on the culture of immigrants, and on multiculturalism as a byproduct of empire and soft power. Morally, the denial of an immigrant their right of entry would have to be sure to qualify as an ‘extreme case’, with culture directly under threat, for it to be valid. Immigration ethics is one of the few areas where philosophical abstraction can have powerful influences on policy, but striving for the most ‘moral’ solution may not, in fact, bring about the most effective solution. The fine modulation of the right to exclude, however, is the most practical way to vindicate a state’s conscience, while providing societies the easiest path to cultural assimilation and adaption. Works Cited Alibhai-Brown, Y. (n.d.). After Multiculturalism. London Carens, J. (2013) The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford Kymlicka, W. (2012) Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future . Washington DC Miller, D. (2005) ‘Immigration: The Case for Limits’, in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics . Oxford (eds. A. Cohen and C. Wellman) Perry, S. (1995) ‘Immigration, justice and culture’, in Justice in Immigration . Cambridge (ed. W. Schwartz
7 Example in part adapted from Miller 2005. 8 Carens 2013.
170
Made with FlippingBook - PDF hosting