Is it rational to fear death?
Thomas C
This essay uses the Epicurean view of death as a framework to prove that our commonplace fear of death is irrational. For the purposes of this argument, I will make some metaphysical assumptions: in line with Epicurean thinking, and for the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that all value in life can be attributed to pleasure or pain (hedonism). It will also assumed that our existence ends at the moment of death, at which moment we are transferred to a state of non-existence. 1 The term ‘death’ will be construed to be the moment at which the subject enters a state of non-existence, and the subsequent state of non- existence; 2 this avoids the obvious conception that fear of the dying process (an often-painful affair) is rational. It also avoids certain arguments about the afterlife creating outcomes where death could be feared (e.g., the existence of hell in Christianity), as the continued experience of a soul after death does not constitute true non-existence. Finally, when referring to death in this essay, I take it to mean one’s own death – of course the death of a loved one is an unpleasant experience that could rationally be feared. What is fear, and what makes a fear rational? Evolutionarily, our fear response has evolved to keep us safe from cases of harm (or states that may lead to harm) that may ultimately lead to death – being alone, being in the dark, being chased by a sabre-toothed tiger. Although from this it could then be said that the object of our fear is death, I believe this is not the case; we fear instances of harm, with the goal being to avoid death. It is not death itself that we fear in most cases. When being chased by a sabre-toothed tiger, person p is not likely to be thinking about the unique ways in which the prospect of death and non-existence is frightening; p is more likely to be thinking about the ways in which this interaction could be painful. As Baillie identifies, 3 the fear elicited by the recognition of one’s own inescapable mortality is an inherently unnatural state of mind– he dubs this ‘existential shock’. In most instances of fear other than fear of death, the sense of self is robust, and there is a precise (usually external) cause that can be navigated using our evolutionary fear response. However, when we are subject to ‘existential shock’, the sense of self is undermined internally, without an obvious cause, and without an obvious navigational strategy, hence why the fear of death is so unnatural. The question is, can this ‘existential shock’ be the object of rational fear? On the basis of the aforementioned evolutionary object of fear, as well as the principle of hedonism, I construe a rational fear to be one that informs a response that minimizes harm. So now the question is: can death harm us?
1 This assumption is outlined in Feldman (1991). Although he admits that he finds this view ‘implausible’ on materialist grounds (how can we say a person no longer exists when they continue to do so as a corpse?), Feldman recognizes that there are cases in which the body is fundamentally changed in death, such as located at ground zero of a nuclear impact – ultimately he adopts this assumption to better engage with Epicurean beliefs. 2 Death is defined similarly in Rosenbaum (1986), distinguishing the dying process from the moment of death and the state of being dead. 3 Baillie (2020).
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