RUSSIAN AND CHINESE USE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF POWER IN AFRICA
Having surveyed Russian and Chinese interests and influence in Africa, this paper now moves to an examination of how the two advance those interests and build that influence. Like all states, they do so by using what are commonly known as the instruments of power or instruments of statecraft. Although there are differing definitions of what these instruments are, one common framework lists them as diplomatic, informational, military and economic tools. Analyzing how Moscow and Beijing deploy and use these instruments in Africa can reveal several things. First, it can help us understand the intensity of Russian and Chinese interests in Africa. For example, if a state deploys all four instruments in significant quantities in a certain re- gion, we can infer that this state sees its interests in that region as important or even vital. Examining the instruments of power can also tell us which interests a state sees as most important in a region.
For example, if a state’s security presence in a given region is far higher than the presence of other instruments, we can infer that the state sees this region primarily in terms of its importance to the state’s security interests. Finally, examining how two different states use the instruments of power in a region can reveal clues about which state sees the region as more important.
Of course, instruments of power are rarely deployed individually, but are most often deployed together, as part of a policy or strategy. In statecraft, as E.H. Carr notes, “power is an indivisible whole; one instrument cannot exist for long in the absence of the others.” This paper defines the instruments of power as follows: [25]
// RUSSIA AND CHINA IN AFRICA Delphi Global Research Center
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