The California Trial Penalty

of severe criminal penalties, sentencing enhancements and mandatory minimums should a defendant proceed to trial, as well as defense counsels’ excessive caseloads contributing to the pressure on defendants to take pleas and forgo exercising their statutory and constitutional rights because their defense counsel did not have the time and resources to mount a potential meritorious defense. In February 2023, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section’s Plea Bargain Task Force published a report, “2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report,” to analyze and address persistent criticism of the plea bargain system in the United States. The report found that while the benefits of plea bargaining (managing limited judicial resources, incentivizing defendants’ cooperation with the government, providing clear and certain resolution of criminal proceedings and providing alternatives for defendants to avoid some of the most severe aspects of the criminal system) in moderation may have merit, the overuse of pleas undermines fundamental values of the criminal legal system. In particular, the report highlighted that “defendants—including innocent defendants—are sometimes coerced into taking pleas and surrendering their right to trial.” Further, the report noted that “the integrity of the criminal justice system is negatively affected by the sheer number of cases resolved by pleas” and that misconduct by police and the government often goes unchecked because cases resolved by pleas do not proceed to pretrial hearings where such misconduct would be litigated. The report highlights that the “loss of trials in favor of plea bargains is a profound loss for civic engagement” and that jury trials provide “critical oversight” to the criminal justice system, remaining “one of the only ways for citizens to shape how prosecutors enforce laws” and that the “voice of the community is almost entirely lost in a system dominated by pleas.” Further, the trial penalty can fail to discourage police misconduct, by shielding police actions from the public scrutiny of a trial. By encouraging pleas early in the trial process, police are insulated from any accountability for their day-to-day, street-level decisions that might arise through suppression hearings and trial proceedings. Further, pleas often require the defendant to waive their right to pursue civil actions for potential police misconduct, preventing further public scrutiny of police actions. 19 In March 2026, NACDL, in conjunction with the Connecticut Office of Chief Public Defender and Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, published “The Trial Penalty in Connecticut: Are People Being Punished for Exercising Their Constitutional Rights?” 20 This statewide study of the trial penalty in Connecticut over a 5-year period compared the sentences in criminal cases that were tried to verdicts of guilty to the best plea offer in the same case. For this

report, data analysis was performed by the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy, School of Public Policy, University of Connecticut. This study found that defendants experienced a trial penalty in 62% of convictions. Among all cases with a trial penalty, the average trial penalty was a stunning 14.6 years. Post-trial sentences were roughly 1.5 times longer than guilty plea sentences. These studies document that, because prosecutors and police almost never have to prove that arrests, prosecution decisions, and convictions are justified and supported by the evidence, there is little incentive against over-policing, particularly in low-income communities and communities of color. Indeed, a 2022 study of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining in Philadelphia engaged in a three-pronged approach of plea bargain policy review, interviews and surveys of both assistant district attorneys (“ADAs”) and defendants who accepted pleas, and case data analysis as well as detailed review of sample cases, and concluded that not only do ADAs feel that they exercise wide discretion in the plea bargaining process, but also there do not seem to be many official mechanisms for checking decision- making after a plea bargain is accepted. 21 The study also found that the ADAs surveyed acknowledged that they received limited training on plea bargaining. 22 Numerous studies establish the devastating impact of over-policing on these communities. 23 As a result, advocates against discriminatory policing outcomes identify a lack of accountability with respect to prosecutorial discretion, and recommend that “prosecutors should state their reasons for plea offers on the record to create transparency, and should be required to collect and share data about plea offers in order to expose any disparities.” 24 Research has also confirmed that defendants’ fear of a lengthier sentence post-trial is well founded. One study, based on all federal criminal cases from 2006 to 2008, found that those who exercised their right to trial received sentences that were 64% longer than similarly situated individuals who pled guilty prior to trial. 25 Accordingly, the study found that because trials pose significant risks of materially longer sentences, defendants are dissuaded from putting the government to its proof, and as a result, prosecutors can “adjudicate both criminal culpability and the magnitude of any punishment largely unfettered by concerns about the likelihood that the defendant might be found not guilty at trial.” 26 These and other studies 27 paint a Kafkaesque portrait of the plea “negotiation” process for criminal defendants, particularly for those who are innocent but nonetheless choose to plead guilty to avoid the potential of a disproportionate sentence after trial should they be convicted. 28

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

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