20. NACDL, Conn. Office of Chief Public Defender & Conn. Criminal Defense Lawyers Ass’n, “The Trial Penalty in Connecticut: Are People Being Punished for Exercising Their Constitutional Rights?” (March 2026), https://www.nacdl.org/Document/ TrialPenaltyConnecticutPunishedforExercisingRights. 21. See Andreea Matei et al., An Exploration of Prosecutorial Discretion in Plea Bargaining in Philadelphia , at 14, Urban Institute (Nov. 29, 2022), https://www.urban. org/research/publication/exploration-prosecutorial- discretion-plea-bargaining-philadelphia.
10. The following detailed reports have concluded that the trial penalty is a real phenomena and analyze its myriad harmful on the federal criminal legal system: Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013) (hereinafter “HRW Report”); Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. , The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It (2018); Norman L. Reimer & Martín Antonio Sabelli, The Tyranny of the Trial Penalty: The Consensus that Coercive Plea Practices Must End , Vol. 31 Federal Sentencing Reporter Issue 4-5 (Apr./June 2019). Comparable data for state court criminal cases generally is scarce, save for a 2021 comprehensive New York trial penalty report, a 2023 American Bar Association report, and the recently issued March 26, 2026 Connecticut trial penalty report. Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws. , The New York State Trial Penalty: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack (2021); Am. Bar Ass’n, Crim. Just. Section, 2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report (2023) (hereinafter “2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report”); The Trial Penalty in Connecticut: Are People Being Punished for Exercising Their Constitutional Rights? (2026) (hereinafter “The Connecticut Report”). 11. See Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, The Trial Penalty: the Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It. at 14 (2018).
22. See id. at 18.
23. See, e.g. , Stacey J. Bosick, Racial Disparities in Prosecutorial Outcomes: An analysis of felony cases accepted for prosecution by the Denver District Attorney’s Office in the City and County of Denver (Report No. 19-04A), University of Denver, Colorado Evaluation and Action Lab (Mar. 2021), file:///H:/ temp/convert/Racial-Disparities-in-Prosecutorial- Outcomes.pdf; Phila. Dist. Att’y’s Off., Racial Injustice Report: Disparities in Philadelphia’s Criminal Courts from 2015-2022 (June 2023), https://phillyda.org/wp-content/ uploads/2023/06/RACIAL-INJUSTICE-REPORT-2023.pdf. 24. Equal Just. Initiative, Research Finds Evidence of Racial Bias in Plea Deals (Oct. 26, 2017), https://eji.org/news/ research-finds-racial-disparities-in-plea-deals/ . 25. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study , 84 Miss. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2015) (“Finally, this Article uses its findings to demonstrate that the average federal defendant who goes to trial would actually have been much better off pleading guilty, even after accounting for her chances for acquittal. As this study shows, defendants who go to trial have only a twelve percent chance of being acquitted, but can expect a sixty-four percent longer sentence if convicted, a poor gamble by any metric.”).
12. See 2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report, supra note 10, at 6.
13. HRW Report, supra note 10, at 2.
14. Id. ; see also id. at 3 (“When prosecutors choose to pursue charges carrying mandatory penalties and the defendant is convicted, judges must impose the sentences. Prosecutors, in effect, sentence convicted defendants by the charges they bring.”). 15. Id. at 31 (“[F]rom 1980 to 2010, the percentage of federal drug cases resolved by a plea increased from 68.9 percent to 96.9 percent.”). 16. Id. at 2 (“[P]lea agreements, once a choice to consider, have for all intents and purposes become an offer drug defendants cannot afford to refuse.”).
26. Id . at 1213-14.
27. See, e.g. , Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the Disappearing Jury Trial: Perspectives From Attorneys and Judges , 81 La. L. Rev. 119, 126 (2020) (“[I]n 2012, the average sentence received by a federal drug offender after trial was three times higher than the average sentence received after a guilty plea: 16 years versus 5 years and 3 months.
17. Id. at 100 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 2.
19. See, e.g. , Town of Newton v. Rumery , 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987).
Evidence indicates that judges in state courts, too, impose lower penalties on defendants who plead guilty and waive their right to a trial.”).
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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack
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