COLLEGE UNDERGRADUATE P hilosophy Journal
VOLUME V | 2022
The Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal Volume V (2022)
Editor in Chief Adrien D’Aprile
Editorial Board Sintra Nichols Gianna Nicosia Kirk Chamberlain Faculty Advisors Dr. Sasha Biro Dr. Joseph Campisi
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies Marist College Poughkeepsie, NY
Table of Contents
“ The Ontology of Identity and Possibility of Reincarnation ”
4
Tenzin Tsundu, Marist College
“ Allowing Reliabilism to Account for Evidence ” Klayton Silverpen, Central Michigan University
16
“ Nomadic Theory and the Role of Women ”
26
Victoria Attala, Marist College
“ The Ontological Status of Modern Poetry ”
34
Jesse Ferraioli, Dartmouth College
Interview
45
Quayshawn Spencer, University of Pennsylvania
Volume V (2022) (2015)
The Ontology of Identity and Possibility of Reincarnation
Tenzin Tsundu Marist College
Abstract
This paper argues that reincarnation is metaphysically possible and provides a more reasonable account of existence after bodily death than the account of resurrection proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker. The paper investigates Baker’s conditions for resurrection and criticisms of it rendered by Andrei A. Buckareff and Joel S. Van Wagenen. The paper claims that understanding identity as a perduring entity rather than an enduring entity makes the account of reincarnation more coherent and protects it from proposed criticisms. This perduring view of identity corresponds congruently with the scientific view of time and maps better with an individual’s lived experience. This paper extends the discussion on the metaphysics of reincarnation, demonstrating its dependency on the nature of individual identity.
Reincarnation has been a core belief in many religions for millennia. However, today, many
people believe this concept to be nothing more than a myth invented to fulfill people’s most
primitive desire to transcend death. This paper will investigate the idea of reincarnation,
establishing that the very nature of “identity” makes reincarnation metaphysically possible. Firstly,
the paper examines previously proposed concepts of reincarnation or related concepts, such as
resurrection, to identify their shortcomings and introduce a new concept of reincarnation,
improving upon the previously proposed concepts. Specifically, this paper examines the
constitution view of the resurrection process proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker and investigates
criticisms of it rendered by Buckareff and Wagenen. In doing so, this paper proposes that Baker’s
claim that a person — their first-person perspective — remains the same throughout their lifetime and after the resurrection is not accurate. 1 Instead, this paper argues that a person — their personal
identity — is not an enduring entity, i.e., an entity that does not change and is wholly present
1 Andrei A. Buckareff and Joel S. Van Wagenen, “Surviving Resurrection,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67, no. 3 (2009): 138, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0.
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whenever it exists, but rather a perduring entity that changes and has temporal parts, i.e., it is not
wholly present at a given time. This change in the concept of personal identity makes the concept
of reincarnation more coherent and defends it from the criticisms of Buckareff and Wagenen.
Finally, applying the newly proposed concept of identity, this paper argues that reincarnation is metaphysically possible and provides a reasonable account of existence after death. 2
Reincarnation is the transference of an individual or an aspect of the individual after
death — whether it is consciousness, mind, or some other entity — in one or more successive existences. 3 It may be considered a mental continuum of some sort, i.e., the transference of not a
soul but of some mental characteristics such as behavioral traits, affinities, first person-perspective,
and so forth. For example, if a person’s identity is defined by their behavioral traits and affinities,
the transference or occurrence of these defining factors in another body can be considered reincarnation. To illustrate, in time t 1 , a person “Sam” with body “A” has “X” behavioral traits and “Y” affinities, and in t ime t 2 , a person “Max” with body “B” has “X” behavioral traits and “Y” affinities. In this case, Sam and Max can be considered the same person even though they have different bodies at different times. Sam in t 1 has reincarnated into Max in t 2 . Hence, to prove that
reincarnation is possible, it is essential to first establish which aspect of an individual constitutes
the person’s identity and if that aspect is able to transcend death.
According to Baker, the most prominent defender of Christian resurrection, the first-person perspective is the entity that encompasses a person’s identity and transcends bodily death. 4 She
presumes that a person’s identity, i.e., their first -person perspective, is not identical for every
person. If that was the case then according to her identity condition, which is discussed later,
everyone would be the same person. Simple anecdotal evidence from one’s own life is enough to
understand the proposition mentioned above — identity is not the same for all individuals. Everyone
can agree that there is something similar and different about every individual. However, it is the
different distinctive characteristics of individuals that give humans the ability to differentiate
between people. For the context of this paper, these distinctive or unique characteristics of an
individual that define them and make them different from other individuals can be labeled as their
identity. And, for Baker, this identity differentiation is caused by the difference in first-person
perspective between individuals.
2 In this paper, death means the cessation of personal identity — first person perspective —in an individual’s body. 3 “Reincarnation” ( Encyclopædia Britannica , March 26, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/topic/reincarnation. 4 Lynne Rudder Baker, “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43, no. 3 (2007): 339, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507008931.
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For Baker, the first-person perspective is the essential property of a person. In Persons and
Bodies: A Constitution View, she writes that a "person is an ontological kind whose defining characteristic is a first-person perspective.” 5 Here, the first-person perspective is the ability to
"think about oneself as oneself and think about one's thoughts as one's own. The first-person
perspective opens a distinction between thinking of oneself in the first-person reference and thinking of oneself in the third person reference.” 6 For example, someone could say, “I’m happy,”
through the first- person point of view or say something like, “I wonder whether I’ll be happy in the
future, ” through a third -person reference. In the secon d example, the “I” doing the wondering and
the “I” who is being wondered about is the same person. In addition, Baker writes, “since human
persons are necessarily embodied, a person can think of their body, as well as their thoughts, from a first-person pe rspective.” 7 In simple terms, first-person perspective is how an individual sees,
perceives, and interacts with the world.
It is this first-person perspective that determines the persistence conditions that make
resurrection possible after death. Baker, in Person and Metaphysics of Resurrection, states that
The persistence conditions of a human person are determined by the property in virtue of which she is a person – viz. the property of having a first-person perspective: a human person could cease to have an organic body without without ceasing to exist. But she could not cease to be a person without ceasing ceasing to exist. 8
Therefore, reincarnation is possible – resurrection in her case – if this first-person perspective
persists.
Now that this paper has determined the entity that constitutes identity, it needs to determine
the conditions required for a person to be reincarnated or resurrected. According to Baker, three features characterize resurrection: identity, embodiment, and the miracle condition. 9 The identity condition requires that "the very same person who exists on earth is to exist in an afterlife." 10
Therefore, for Baker, some weaker form of a mental continuum where a defining characteristic is
not transferred or if there is a change in first-person perspective during the transfer will not be
considered resurrection. The second condition deals with the person having a body after death, and
5 Baker, 335. 6 Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 67-68. 7 Baker, 68. 8 Baker, “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection,” 339.
9 Baker, 339. 10 Baker, 339.
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the miracle condition deals with divine intervention. 11
The two latter conditions, embodiment and miracle conditions, are reasonable if Christian
theology is accepted. However, the first condition requires considerable evidence, outside of
divinity, to explain the continuity of the first-person perspective, i.e., how it remains the same
throughout an individual’s life. I n their critique of Baker’s constitutional view, Buckareff and
Wagenen point out that it is not evident that these three conditions provide an adequate theory of resurrection. 12 Nonetheless, this theory of conditions provides a framework to understand the
criteria by which persistence of identity after the body’s death is possible. It also provides a
foundation for future theories of resurrection and reincarnation to build upon and improve.
Baker suggests “sameness of the first -person perspective allows one to survive a complete change of body, including brain.” 13 Therefore, for her, A at t 1 and B at t 2 are the same person if and only if A and B have the same first-person perspective. 14 She claims that:
(T) For all objects, x and y and times t and t I , if x is a human person at t and y is a human person at t 1 , then x = y if and only if for all human bodies, z, w, necessarily: (z constitutes x at t if and only if z constitutes y at t ) and (w constitutes x at t I if and only if w constitutes y at t 1 ). 15
The above equation means that two bodies at different times can be said to have been constituted
by the same person if and only if they share the same first- person perspective. Baker’s description
of the sameness of personal identity depends on whether the persons share the same first-person
perspective. In addition, her argument about personal identity assumes that: (i) personal identity is
independent of the body and (ii) personal identity is an enduring entity.
Buckareff and Wagenen argue against the notion that personal identity or Baker's account of the first-person perspective is independent of the body by using several thought experiments. 16
For example, they consider the following:
Charles is a fully functioning human adult. Unfortunately, Charles's doctor tells Charles that he is terminally ill. But, he can avoid it by getting transferred to another donor's body. His previous body will be destroyed, but his first-person perspective will be preserved throughout the transfer. Thus, he will identify his last body as having constituted him before the procedure and regard his new body as
11 Baker, 340. 12 Buckareff and Wagenen, 125. 13 Baker, “Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View,” 125. 14 Buckareff and Wagenen, 126. 15 Baker, 139.
16 They use five cases of thought experiments. All the cases come to the same conclusion stated above and provide a similar thought process. Therefore, this paper did not consider it necessary to give more than one example to understand their critique.
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constituting him afterward. However, accidentally, the new body Charles is being transferred into belonged to an autistic person. Therefore, Charles's new body puts some severe limitations on Charles’s cognitive functions, including several aspects of his first-person perspective. 17
It is reasonable to assume that there will be several changes in Charles’s mental state once he gets
transferred to the autistic body. Charles will no longer have the previous personality or traits made
possible by a fully functioning human body. Using this thought experiment, Buckareff and
Wagenen establish that even though the first-person perspective remains the same, it is not enough to constitute personal identity. 18 Therefore, personal identity is dependent on the body it is
constituted in.
Secondly, Baker's insistence on the sameness of the first-person perspective at different times t and t I assumes that personal identity remains the same throughout an individual's life.
However, this paper argues that such persistence of first-person perspective is not possible, i.e.,
first-person perspective does not remain the same for a person. A miraculous transfer of the body,
such as the one Charles’ underwent, is not required to demonstrate that first -person perspective
changes. The change in first-person perspective also means that identity does not remain the same. For example, consider a person, Mark, who is fifty years old at time t 1 . Suddenly, he contracts a severe form of dementia that prevents him from exhibiting most of his former personality traits and impacts his first-person perspective. His symptoms are fully developed at time t 2 . In this case, he
did not have to undergo a bodily transfer to have the same mental changes as Charles in the
previous example. However, as established earlier, this change in cognitive function can change his
identity. The question thus remains: is he the same person? Many of us will have trouble answering
this question because it is difficult to comprehend the nature of this question. Does the question ask if Mark at time t 1 is the same as Mark at time t 2 , or does it ask if Mark at t 1 and Mark at time t 2 are both Mark? To help answer this question, let us consider a less extreme case. Consider a time t 1 where a child, Tim, is ten years old — with his unique first-person perspective and personal identity. Now, consider a time t 2 where Tim has grown to become a full-fledged 42-year-old adult. It is reasonable
to assume from people’s experience growing up that there will be tremendous changes in
personality, behavior, and personal identity because of the experiences and challenges Tim faces
17 Buckareff and Wagenen, 129. 18 Buckareff and Wagenen, 130.
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during the time between t 1 and t 2 . It can also be assumed that Tim at t 2 has faced a series of
illnesses and possibly a major accident that has changed his body and, subsequently, his first-
person perspective. Do the changes he undergoes in his first-person perspective – his identity – make him a different person? One can either consider Tim at t 1 and t 2 as two different persons or
argue that Tim is the same person.
The first option, considering them as two different persons leads to significant challenges. If
a change in time causes personal identity and personhood to change, then a human being can be
infinite persons in one lifetime as time can be indefinitely reduced. In other words, Tim, one
second earlier, is different from Tim now, and they are different from Tim one second later. This
option leads to an infinite regress. Therefore, it is reasonable to neglect the first option. The second option, considering Tim at t 1 and t 2 to be the same person — having the same
first-person perspective — is not reasonable under the identity condition because of the changing
nature of the first-person perspective. However, there must be a reason why identity persists
throughout time to counteract the illogical consequences in both these options. This paper argues
that both these problems are solved if personal identity is considered a perduring entity rather than
an enduring entity.
Perdurance is a concept that suggests that entities such as animals, boats, and planets, have
temporal parts in addition to their spatial parts, i.e., an entity is made up of time-slices of its components. 19 All objects are considered to be elongated in time, i.e., objects are a fusion of all the instantaneous/continuous time slices compiled and blended into a complete mereological whole. 20
For example, consider an apple when it is unripe (greenish), ripe (red), and rotten (brown). One
would consider the apple to be the same apple even though it undergoes drastic changes in its
properties. How can it be the same apple even if its properties and parts are completely different?
Perdurance theory would state that the unripe, ripe, and rotten apple are temporal parts of the
Apple, and the entity Apple is not fully present in a given moment. See figure 1. for a graphical
illustration of this theory - in the figure O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 represent temporal parts of ordinary objects
while t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 represents different times.
19 Katherine Hawley, “Temporal Parts,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, October 5, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/temporal-parts.
20 This paper will not go into where entities are sliced in either instantaneous or continuous time slices. However, it appears that the idea of identity elongation is more coherent if time slices are taken to be continuous.
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Figure 1. The ordinary object perdures 21
Considering identity as a perduring entity depends on a scientific view of time, called
eternalism, which suggests that objects from both the past and the future exist.
According to eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. 22
Just like how New York City and Tokyo exist at the same time but in different spatial locations,
this view argues that the future and past exist in the same spatial location but in different times. If
the future and past do not exist (are not real), then identity cannot have temporal parts.
In addition, this view of time does not privilege the present moment and the present
“identity” of a person. Seeing identity as a perduring entity means that a person is not fully present
at a given moment in time. Personal identity at a given time t is only a partial manifestation of a whole extended throughout time. This understanding of identity makes it possible for Tim at t 1 and Tim at t 2 to both be Tim. The only difference would be that Tim at t 1 and Tim at t 2 are partial
manifestations of the identity 'Tim.' Similar to how an ear, a nose, an arm, or a leg, are not the
whole body but parts of the body, Tim’s temporal parts are not Tim’s identity but parts of Tim’s
identity.
21 Sean Enda Power, “Change and Persistence,” in Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 2021), 79. 22 Nina Emery, Ned Markosian, and Meghan Sullivan, “Time,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, November 24, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/.
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This change in the concept of identity defends it from the criticisms proposed by Buckareff and Wagenen. As mentioned in their earlier example Charles at time t 1 before being transferred into a body belonging to an autistic person is Charles, and Charles at t 2 after the transfer is also
Charles — th ey are temporal parts of the entity “Charles” at different times. However, considering
identity as a perduring entity puts forth another problem: what binds those temporal parts together?
For example, if temporal parts can have different first-person perspectives, then one can make the
argument that every identity that exists is a temporal part of one single “Identity”— all identities are
manifestations of one entity. Using the previous example of an apple as a perduring entity, the
spatial part of the apple that is its body can serve as the binding object of different temporal parts of
that apple. As long as the apple that is going through time shares the same spatial part, i.e., its
physical body, it can be considered parts of the same “apple,” and not a di fferent one. However,
this idea of the physical body being the binding entity does not translate in the same way for a
person, making it difficult to conceive of a binding entity that is different for different individuals.
Consider the following thought experiment: as AI advances, it becomes possible to upload a
person’s consciousness, awareness, first -person perspective, behavior, or psyche, into a robot that
can fully operate as a human body. This example is similar to Buckareff and Wagenen’s example
of a miraculous transfer of the body. There is a change in the body, but it is difficult to confirm
with certainty if the change in the body makes the person entirely different in the sense that the
person is not part of the previous temporal parts and becom es a whole new entity. If Baker’s
argument is taken seriously, in terms of the body not constituting identity and first-person
perspective being the key concept to understanding identity, it is reasonable to consider first-person
perspective being more feasible as a binding entity for identity than a body.
Another philosopher who appears to have the same understanding of human consciousness is Edmund Husserl. Husserl believes “consciousness extends through time itself.” 23 There are
several arguments he puts forth in The Phenomenology of Internal-time Consciousness , but one of
the most relevant arguments, in the context of this paper, is his explanation for the continuity of
consciousness in time. As Michael Kelly states,
To explain how consciousness extends beyond the now in its act of perception, Husserl begins to think that consciousness itself must have a “width.” And this is just to say that consciousness must have a sense of the past and a sense of the future, to begin with. To this end, Husserl attempts to argue that consciousness extends to capture past moments of
23 Barry Dainton, “Temporal Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, June 28, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/.
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experience and temporal objects therein by “retaining” and “pretending” the elapsed and yet-to-come phases of its experience and thereby the past words that do not presently exist. 24
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the binding entity itself must have the ability to “ flow
through time ” or “ extend through time. ” As long as a binding entity can transcend bodily death,
reincarnation is possible.
Influential theories of personal identity proposed by David Armstrong, David Lewis, Robert
Nozick, Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker suggest that "personal identity through time
necessarily involves causal continuity but does not necessarily involve continuity of the same body or of the same brain." 25 In other words, causal continuity, the binding entity necessary for personal
identity, does not necessarily require a particular body or brain's continued existence. Casual
continuity can be explained as the continuation of an entity through time because of a causal
connection. For example, causal continuation happens when a person remembers something they
did yesterday or where their previous intention persists and today gives rise to an action. In other
words, it is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness where there is sufficient connectedness to justify the claim that X and Y are the same people. 26 For this paper's argument, it
is not essential to explain the criteria for a "strong connectedness" that causes causal continuity
between a person with different bodies at different times — as long as causal continuance is
possible, reincarnation is possible. Not addressing this problem does not weaken the argument that
identity is not limited to the present and can possibly transcend death, manifesting itself in different
times and bodies.
As mentioned in the introduction, the paper does not plan to prove the truth of reincarnation
but attempts to demonstrate that it is possible given the ontology of identity, while at the same time
proving the advantage of this view over the constitutional view of resurrection proposed by Baker.
Reincarnation does not have the same stringent demands that Baker has in terms of unchanging
first-person perspective that is not impacted by bodily constitution. Reincarnation is possible as
long as a binding entity is present whether it be first-person perspective or causal continuity.
In conclusion, there are two significant problems with Baker’s account of the constitution
view: it assumes that personal identity is independent of the body and that personal identity
24 Michael Kelly, “Phenomenology and Time - Consciousness,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/. 25 Robert Elliot, “Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement,” The Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 162 (January 1, 1991): pp. 55-75, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219786. 26 Elliot, 55.
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remains the same throughout a person’s lifetime. Buckareff and Wagenen’ s criticisms and thought
experiments conspicuously demonstrate the weakness of the first assumption. This paper
establishes that the second assumption also does not accurately reflect the nature of identity — given
a person’s lived experience of change and t ransformation. In addition, the paper proves that
identity can be viewed as a perduring entity and understanding identity as such solves the problems
with Baker’s account. Finally, the paper discusses and resolves some possible criticisms regarding
the perduring account of identity to demonstrate that reincarnation is metaphysically possible.
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Bibliography
Baker, Lynne Rudder. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View . Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005.
----------- . “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.” Religious Studies 43, no.3 (2007): 333 –
48. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507008931.
Buckareff, Andrei A., and Joel S. Van Wagenen. “Surviving Resurrection.” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 67, no. 3 (2009): 123 – 39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-
9222-0.
Dainton, Barry. “Temporal Consciousness.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford
University, June 28, 2017.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-temporal/.
Elliot, Robert. “Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement.” The Philosophical
Quarterly 41, no. 162 (January 1, 1991): 55 – 75. https://doi.org/10.2307/2219786.
Emery, Nina, Ned Markosian, and Meghan Sullivan. “Time.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Stanford University, November 24, 2020.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/.
Hawley, Katherine. “Temporal Parts.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Stanford University,
October 5, 2015. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/temporal-parts.
Kelly, Michael. “Phenomenology and Time - Consciousness.” The Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, March 4, 2022. https://iep.utm.edu/phe-time/.
Lewis, David. “Extrinsic Properties.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
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Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 44, no. 2 (September 1983): 197 – 200.
https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4319628.
Marmodoro, Anna, and Erasmus Mayr. Metaphysics. An Introduction to Contemporary Debates
and Their History . Kettering: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Stanford University,
September 6, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/.
Power, Sean Enda. “Change and Persistence.” Essay. In Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary
Introduction , 78 – 79. Routledge, 2021.
“Reincarnation.” Encyclopædia Britannica , March 26, 2021. www.britannica.com.
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Allowing Reliabilism to Account for Evidence
Klayton Silverpen Central Michigan University
Abstract
I argue against evidentialism, the position that beliefs are justified when the belief fits the belief- holder’s evidence, and instead argue in favor of reliabilism, the position that a belief is justified if it was formed using a reliable-belief forming process. However, I recognize a key issue with reliabilism is that it does not account for evidence. To help reliabilism handle this problem better, I propose that only processes that use evidence or existing justified beliefs as inputs be considered reliable belief-forming processes. I also add that multiple processes can contribute to the justification of a single belief, rather than only one process per belief. With these adjustments, I show how my account of reliabilism can better stand up to the criticisms made by Feldman and Conee in their paper “Evidentialism.” This puts reliabilism on somewhat equal footing as evidentialism. I then make a case for why I think reliabilism should be preferred, even though my account of reliabilism and Feldman and Conee’s account of evidentialism end up looking very similar.
I. Introduction
Evidentialism is the view that a belief is justified when it fits the belief- holder’s evidence.
In other words, the evidence is doing the justifying for any given belief. I would agree that
evidence is important in justification. However, I do not think that evidence is what makes a belief
justified or not. Instead, something must be done with the evidence to make it into a belief. I find it
more plausible that the process by which evidence is used to form beliefs is what does the
justifying for that belief, not the evidence alone. I am defending a form of reliabilism. Reliabilism
is the view that a reliable belief-forming process is what justifies a belief. Where my case for
reliabilism may differ from others is that I believe that evidence is still an important factor in
justifying beliefs, and I wish to give an adequate account of evidence’s role while also contending
that the evidence itself is not the justifying factor. I argue that evidence is necessary for
justification, but it is not sufficient . Instead, the reliable belief-forming process is what adds
justifying power to evidence.
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In my defense, I am going to propose two changes to the traditional reliabilist view. The
first is to directly account for the importance of evidence. I propose that only those processes which
use evidence as input can be a reliable belief-forming process. In other words, having evidence as
input for a process is necessary for that process to be considered a reliable belief-forming process
(although it is not sufficient - the process also needs to lead to true beliefs more often than it leads
to false beliefs). Now, I am including existing justified beliefs as evidence because justified beliefs
can be traced back to evidence. If the input is an existing belief, then that existing belief must have
been formed through some belief-forming process. If we assume this belief, call it belief A , to be
formed through a reliable process, then some other input went into that process that resulted in
output A . That input is either evidence or an existing belief. If it is another belief, call it belief B,
then the same is true of B as was true of A . This cycle will repeat until, eventually, you reach some
belief where the input was evidence. Based on this observation, I will consider justified beliefs to
be a valid input for a reliable belief-forming process, in addition to direct evidence.
The second change is each belief does not need to be limited to one justifying process.
Instead, I argue that there are many processes involved, many of which are belief-forming
processes, which contribute to the justification of the belief output. Alvin Goldman says that
reliabilism admits to degrees of justification with no problem, s aying “We can and do regard certain beliefs as more justified than others.” 1 A belief-forming process does not make a belief
justified or not justified based on if the process is reliable or not reliable; rather, a belief-forming
process makes a belief more or less justified based on how reliable the process is. Following this, it
should not be an issue to allow multiple belief-forming processes into the equation. Each belief-
forming process involved influences the total justifiedness of the resulting belief, and how justified
a belief will be determined by the overall justifiedness of all of the involved processes taken into
account together.
To say all this more concisely, I am arguing for a view of reliabilism that states that a belief
is justified to the extent that it is made using belief-forming processes that use evidence (including
existing justified beliefs) as input and lead to true beliefs more often than false beliefs, and the
overall justifiedness is determined by the overall reliability of all eligible processes involved. To
show how well this view holds, I am going to go over the arguments against reliabilism made by
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee in their essay “Evidentialism” and see if my updated version of
1 Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” Justification and Knowledge , ed. George Pappas (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), 10.
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reliabilism can stand up better to their arguments.
II. Responding to Feldman and Conee
Feldman and Conee argue against the reliabilist view, saying that it only serves as an
account of well-foundedness (WF), which is only a part of their evidentialist view. Furthermore, they find reliability to be weaker than their notion of WF. 2
Feldman and Connee’s WF is an addition to their evidentialism that states that, in addition
to having the evidence, one must also base their belief on that evidence. They argue the comparison
to reliabilism is fairly clear - both are concerned with properly using the evidence one has in forming a belief. 3 Feldman and Conee note the difference as such: “According to WF, this occurs when the belief is based on fitting evidence. According to reliabilism, a belief is properly grounded if it results from a belief- forming process that reliably leads to true beliefs.” 4 Feldman and Conee
go on to say that reliabilism contains many unclarities. They give two specific accounts.
First, Feldman and Conee claim that “An unclarity about belief -forming processes arises
because every belief is caused by a sequence of particular events which is an instance of many types of causal processes.” 5 There is an issue with defining a “process” that comes from how
specific one should be. Feldman and Conee give the example of a man named Jones who looks
outside his window to see a bright, shining, disk-shaped object. Jones comes to believe that it is a
flying saucer, although it is actually a light-up frisbee that Jones had given his daughter (and he
remembers doing so). Feldman and Conee point out that there are many different levels of
processes involved; “The sequence of events leading to Jones's belief also falls into many relatively
specific categories such as night-vision-of-a-nearby-object and vision-in-Jones's-precise-
environmental-circumstances. … Finally, there is the maximally specific process that occurs only
when physiological events occur that are exactly like those that led to Jones's belief that he saw a flying saucer.” 6 The range goes from as broad as “vision” to as specific as the exact series of
mental events that occurred in that one instance. Which of these is the relevant one, and how
specific do we have to be?
The first question is easier to answer, given my adjusted account of reliabilism. Part of
2 Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48, no. 1 (1985): 25. 3 Feldman and Conee, 24.
4 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 25. 5 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 25. 6 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 26.
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Feldman and Conee’s argument is that “Since the sequence of events leading to his belief is an
instance of many types of process, the answer depends upon which of these many types is the relevant one.” 7 The difficulty comes in trying to decide which process is the “relevant” one.
However, if we allow for multiple processes per belief, there is no trouble with deciding on a single
relevant process, because all processes involved that use evidence as input are accounted for in the
overall justifiedness of the belief. There is no single relevant process, so the question is no longer
an issue.
The second issue also becomes less threatening, although more can be done to address it.
With so many different levels of specificity, it seems there would be an overwhelming number of
different overlapping processes to consider Must every level be taken into account? I would say
yes, to an extent. Differing levels of specificity should be considered, but only as far as they add
relevant changes to the belief- forming process. For example, “vision” is a belief -forming process
(using visual stimuli as evidence to create a belief about what is being seen); “night vision” is
another process; both processes are accounted for because trying to see reliably changes when the
environment is dark. However, “vision” and “daylight vision” would be redundant because it is
assumed that vision is working normally in well-lit conditions.
What about the issue of there being a process that is the exact mental events that occurred
on one specific occasion? I will call this the exact process. Since the exact process would only
occur once, it seems there is no way it can be reliable. I have two responses. First, it should follow
from this observation that this would be a problem with every belief because every belief could be
said to have an exact process. Since it is a problem with every belief, however, it becomes a
problem for no beliefs. Since every belief has an exact process, and every exact process adds the
same amount of justifying power to the belief (that is, assumedly none, since the exact process
cannot be shown to be reliable - the only question is whether it simply adds nothing or actually
detracts from the overall justifiedness), then it becomes the easiest process to account for in every
case. One could even argue this is grounds to outright disregard the exact process.
If my second response to the exact process problem succeeds, then my first one becomes
irrelevant (I included both in case the second does not succeed). In truth, I would say that there is
no “exact process” because if one tried to capture the exact mental events that lead to the belief in
question, they would find many separate processes all working together (which we are already
7 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 25.
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accounting for by allowing for more than one process per belief). For example, the exact mental
events that led Jones to believe there is a flying saucer outside would include his seeing the flying
saucer, his existing biases regarding flying saucers, and his remembering that he had given his
daughter a light-up frisbee. There may even be more, but already we see three clearly distinct
processes. There is no reason to take all of these to be one process, even if they all contribute to the
formation of one belief. There are cases in which it may be difficult to parse if two processes are
distinct or not (such as vision and night vision), but in cases where each of the processes have
distinct inputs, there is no reason to assume them to be the same process. I find it difficult to
believe that there is an “exact process” for any belief that encompasses all mental events that
contributed to that belief without it being made of several distinct processes. In which case, adding
the exact process to the equation would be redundant since all of the individual processes are
assumedly already accounted for.
The second uncertainty Feldman and Conee address is that the notion of “reliable” is not
well agreed upon. They list several di fferent ways of defining “reliable,” including processes that
have led to true beliefs more often than not in the past, processes that lead to true beliefs more
often than not in the past and future, processes that lead to true beliefs more often than not in the
nearest possible worlds, and processes that lead to true beliefs more often than not in all possible
worlds. Feldman and Conee conclude from this that, “Because there are such drastically different ways of filling in the details of reliabilism the a pplication of the theory is far from clear.” 8 I am
unsure how this counts as a problem with the system. It seems to me that this is simply a case of
many thinkers disagreeing. Rather than being one large, confused theory, it seems to me this is just
a case of having several clear options to choose from. The fact that many thinkers disagree on
which is best is hardly a detriment to the theory overall, so long as anyone putting forth their
version of reliabilism is clear about which they endorse, or are at least careful to highlight that the
distinction does not matter to them (admittedly, the distinction does not yet concern me, at least not
for the purposes of this paper). All the examples given also have a common agreement, that reliable
processes lead to true beliefs more often than not. The differences between them seem minor. I
would also argue that a similar question can be made of evidentialism; what makes a belief fit the
evidence? This is an interesting question that I am sure many evidentialists have an answer for; I
would not say it was a flaw in evidentialism if different evidentialists gave different answers to this
8 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 26.
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question. Feldman and Conee then move on to an example originally given by Lawrence Bonjour. 9
Suppose someone with genuine clairvoyance comes to believe the President is in New York as a
result of their clairvoyance. The President is indeed in New York, but they have no other evidence
of this, and they have no evidence that they are clairvoyant, much less evidence that clairvoyance is
reliable. Yet, since the clairvoyance does work, and is, therefore, a reliable belief-forming process
(on the traditional view of reliabilism), their belief should be considered justified. Reliabilists must
either adjust their thesis to get around this is sue or admit that this clairvoyant’s belief is justified.
My adjustments can account for this scenario. In the example, the clairvoyant simply comes to
believe the president is in New York but has no evidence for this belief, not even in the form of
mental experience - the belief simply appears on account of his clairvoyance, and he does not
question it. Since the process by which he formed the belief did not use evidence as an input, it
cannot be considered a reliable belief-forming process. Part of what the clairvoyant example
succeeds in showing is how important evidence is as a component of justified beliefs. Reliabilism
often does not account for this importance, which is why it is so difficult for it to deal with this
counterexample. Since my adjustments to reliabilism allow it to account for the importance of
evidence, it thereby allows reliabilism to account for this counterexample without much issue.
III. In Favor of Reliabilism
I have shown that my adjustments to reliabilism have allowed it to stand up to Feldman and
Conee’s arguments against reliabilism. However, I have not given much reason to prefer
reliabilism over evidentialism. After all, Feldman and Conee could be wrong about every one of
their objections to reliabilism, but it could still be true that evidentialism could do everything
reliabilism does better. To make the case for reliabilism, I wish to highlight why I find reliabilism
to be the more plausible of the two theories.
Feldman and Conee compare reliabilism to their notion of well-foundedness. WF is a
response to an obvious flaw with evidentialism; what if someone has a belief that fits their
evidence, but believes it for reasons other than the evidence they have? It seems their having the
belief and their having the evidence would be unrelated, and they would only have a belief that fits
their evidence by coincidence. WF states that the belief must be based on the evidence to be
9 Laurence Bonjour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge , ” ( Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1980)): 69.
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considered justified. They argue this is similar to reliabilism because they see the reliable belief- forming process as a means of grounding a belief in the proper way. 10 They even later point out
that one could argue that the condition could be that a process which produces beliefs that properly
fit the evidence are reliable, and ones that do not produce beliefs that properly fit the evidence are
not reliable. I nearly agree with this, but I wish to tweak the idea a bit. Instead of thinking of it as a
way of determining whether a process is reliable, we can think of it as a reliable process itself;
properly fitti ng one’s belief to the evidence is a reliable belief -forming process. Since we are
allowing for multiple reliable belief-forming processes per belief, it makes sense to assume that
some process that performs this function (that is, fitting the belief to the evidence) is present in the
formation of any applicable beliefs. If nothing else, involving some sort of process like this would
greatly increase the overall reliability and thus increase the degree to which the belief is justified.
With this in mind, we can see that reliabilism, so long as multiple processes per belief are
warranted, can do more than WF can since it accounts for having fitting beliefs and the justifying
power (whereas WF is only made to account for the former). More than that, I argue that my
account of reliabilism can do more than evidentialism can. Feldman and Conee introduce WF as an
addition to their main thesis of evidentialism, which is that a belief is justified when it fits the evidence, a premise they call EJ. 11 WF only adds that the belief must also be based on the evidence,
in addition to fitting evidence. Here, it becomes unclear to me what EJ and WF together are
accomplishing that the form of reliabilism I am arguing for is not. My form of reliabilism requires
evidence; it can account for how well the belief fits the evidence because processes which fit belief
to evidence well are reliable; it can account for basing the beliefs on the evidence because it is the
process by which the belief holder uses the evidence that is important, not merely their having the
evidence.
With my strong insistence on evidence being a necessary role in justification, it may seem I
have created a form of reliabilism that differs from evidentialism only in terminology. They say the
evidence justifies; I say using the evidence well justifies, but both come to largely the same
consequences. While I admit it can seem to be merely a disagreement of terms, I do believe that the
reliabilist account is truer to the actuality of the situation, and if the two theories turn out to be
equivalent in all other ways, that will be enough for me to prefer reliabilism. I am unconvinced that
simply having evidence that fits the belief is enough to justify it. Feldman and Conee knew this too,
10 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 25. 11 Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 15.
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