Delphi Global Research Center. February 19, 2026
Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Introduction
In mid-January 2026, warships from Russia, China, and Iran began converging o the coast of South Africa. Soon joined by ships of the South African Navy, the visitors were in African waters for the naval exercise “Will for Peace 2026.”. Exercises involving the Russian and Chinese navies have become a regular occurrence around Africa. The most recent one was the third since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The meaning of Will for Peace was more broadly geopolitical than narrowly military. Although the otillas were small—with only two Russian and two Chinese ships participating—the signals the exercise sent were signi cant. For Russia, it served to highlight that its military is still respected and welcome in the Global South, and that attempts to isolate it for its attack on Ukraine have limits. For China, increased military presence in and around Africa serves its goal of building stability on the continent, stability required for Beijing’s signi cant economic investments in Africa to bear fruit. For both, the exercise served to demonstrate their blue-water reach and normalize their naval presence along key sea lanes. [1] Military exercises are only one way Russia and China have been advancing their interests and attempting to build in uence in Africa. Both have also used diplomacy and economic engagement to do so. In 2026, for the 36th straight year, the Chinese Foreign Minister’s rst foreign visit of the year was to Africa. Over that period, there have been “almost 200 visits to 48 African countries involving Chinese heads of state, premiers, and foreign ministers.” This year’s visit is to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, and Lesotho. Russia’s diplomatic engagement with Africa lags China’s, but Moscow is working to increase it. In December 2025, it held the second Russia-Africa Ministerial Conference in Egypt, the rst of the series launched in 2019 to take place in Africa. The conference objective was to set the stage for the upcoming 2026 Russia-Africa Summit to be held in Ethiopia in October, and the secondary goal was to begin drafting the 2026–2029 strategic action plan between Russia and Africa. [2] [3] This paper, the rst in a series of four, will analyze Russian and Chinese interests and in uence in Africa, and provide an overview of their use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments to advance their goals on the continent. Africa arguably matters more for Russia and China than it has at any time in recent history, for several reasons. For Russia, its relations with African states serve to demonstrate that Western attempts to isolate it have failed. In addition, Africa’s volatile security environment—to which Russia sometimes contributes—o ers fertile ground for Moscow’s newly minted Africa Corps (the latest incarnation of the notorious Wagner Group) to operate. For China, Africa is a key node in its attempt to establish an alternative system of global order centered on Beijing. China’s agship economic and security initiatives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Security Initiative (GSI), are all active in Africa.
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
For both Russia and China, Africa o ers another advantage over many parts of the world: a light US footprint, set to get even lighter as the Trump administration focuses US foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere. Since Moscow and Beijing believe the US is determined to limit their freedom of action in areas of the world it deems important, the relative lack of US presence in Africa o ers opportunities that other areas do not. This may prove a double-edged sword: with the US often seen as the “binding agent” in Russian-Chinese relations, the two may nd that—absent the incentive to cooperate against the US—their interests in Africa are not as aligned as they seem.
Russian and Chinese Interests in Africa
Russia’s view of Africa is largely instrumental, and its activities there are self-serving. Moscow’s African goals revolve around reasserting its great power status, countering Western in uence, pro ting from arms sales and security contracts, accessing natural resources, and gaining UN support for (or at least limiting UN condemnation of) its invasion of Ukraine. It has had at least moderate success in all of these areas. Russia’s great power status is an obsession of the Kremlin generally shared by the Russian people. Public opinion polls consistently show the Russian people perceive their country’s great power status as an important goal, and the number of Russians who believe their country is a great power has risen vefold since 2013. Moscow’s diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa serves the goal of building its great power identity, especially when it can erode Western in uence and undermine Western interests in the process. It has especially focused on doing so in the Sahel, by leveraging dissatisfaction with Western peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions and the conditionality that comes with Western assistance. [4] In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic, Russia has replaced international military forces after convincing local governments that Russian Africa Corps forces would be a more e ective and less intrusive partner. While this has allowed Moscow to raise its military pro le in Africa at the expense of the West, it has incurred more losses than gains for its e orts. Mali provides a case in point here. Although it was “advertised as a agship for Russia’s Africa strategy,” Mali has proven to be inhospitable ground for Russian mercenaries, who su ered a total military defeat to Tuareg separatist forces in July 2024, and were unable to prevent a move toward Mali’s capital by an al-Qaeda a liate known as JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal- Muslimin) more recently. [5] But Africa Corps deployments to Africa serve more than military and reputational goals for the Kremlin. Where Moscow’s mercenaries go in Africa, resource extraction often follows. The goal is twofold: gaining resources for Russia and “dislodging Western companies from an area of strategic importance.” In every country in which they operate, Russian mercenaries “have secured valuable natural resources using these to not only cover costs, but also extract signi cant revenue.” Russia extracted some $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa between 2022 and 2024 alone . Whether Russia will continue to accept military losses for economic gains is unclear, but it is clear that Africa Corps deployments serve multiple purposes for the Kremlin. [6] [7] [8]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Russian interests in Africa also center on limiting the diplomatic and reputational damage from its war on Ukraine. Due to its lack of a colonial history in Africa and memories of Soviet support for African liberation movements, Moscow enjoyed a reservoir of goodwill among many African governments. Since February 2022, it has drawn on this goodwill to in uence the UN votes of African states, especially where Ukraine is concerned. Africa routinely has the highest proportion of countries abstaining from or voting against UN resolutions condemning Russia. Immediately after the full-scale invasion, South Africa led a bloc of African countries that abstained from the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Moscow’s aggression. Although over 81% of non-African member states voted for the resolution, only 51% of African members did, underlining the fact that African UN members’ opinion on fault for the war is split. This pattern continues today with African states less willing to condemn Russia than other UN members. [9] Underlining Russia’s instrumental attitude toward Africa is the fact that it has been a fertile recruiting ground for the Russian military, with many Africans sent to ght in Ukraine. Ukraine’s government says over 1,400 Africans are ghting for Russia there, often having been lured to Ukraine on pretense. Luring Africans to ght at the front in Ukraine converts Africa’s poverty to Russia’s advantage, and recruiting foreigners avoids having to mobilize urban ethnic Russians, a move that could carry a high political cost for the Kremlin. [10] [11] China frames its activities and objectives in Africa as win-win—sometimes making good on that promise and other times failing to do so. China’s interests in Africa are broader, more comprehensive, and more formally integrated than Russia’s interests. Where Russia often informally parlays security assistance into resource extraction, China has formal programs aimed at bolstering security (GSI), building the infrastructure of a global trading system (BRI), and enabling economic development (GDI). The overall goal of these programs is to establish a new global order based on China’s vision of itself and its role in the world. Africa matters for this vision for two reasons: its economic potential and the threats to that potential posed by the continent’s seemingly eternal problems of ethnic, religious, and political violence. As Forbes notes, Africa boasts a “rapidly expanding population, abundant natural resources, and rising digital connectivity,” giving it high potential for growth in consumer goods, nancial services, and high-tech. But it is also beset by terrorism, insurgency, piracy, and other forms of mass violence, and these directly a ect both China’s economic investments and its ability to bring Chinese goods to African markets and vice versa. For this reason, two of Beijing’s most important geographic focus areas on the continent are the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, where trade routes and instability intersect. [12]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strongly believes that development and security are linked, and this informs Beijing’s initiatives in Africa, as elsewhere. For the CCP, economic development creates the conditions for long-term security and stability. In the short term, especially in environments like those found in much of Africa, lack of security threatens the type of investment that can enable development. For this reason, China’s security and economic activities in Africa are tightly linked. Partly to protect its investments in Africa, China has a military base in Djibouti, one of only two outside its borders. It has also invested heavily in training African police and lawyers, training over 40,000 from some 40 African countries. Finally, Beijing is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations on the continent, with some 80% of all Chinese peacekeepers deployed to Africa. In all, over 32,000 Chinese soldiers have served in UN missions there, the highest number among permanent members of the UN Security Council. [13] [14]
One area where Chinese and Russian activities in Africa align is in garnering UN votes from African countries. Like Russia, China leverages its history of support for Africa’s anti-colonial movements into support in the UN, especially on issues related to Taiwan.
Russian and Chinese In uence in Africa
Both Russia and China inherited a reservoir of goodwill from many African states, a result of the fact that neither Moscow nor Beijing had a colonial history in Africa, and that both supported African anti-colonial movements during the Cold War. This is especially true of Russia, and especially true in South Africa, where memories of the Soviet Union’s support for the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) run deep. After the end of apartheid and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western leaders pressed new South African President Nelson Mandela about why he supported Russia and its agenda. Mandela angrily replied that the Soviet Union had been the only international source of support for the ANC as it battled apartheid. On a 1999 visit to Moscow, Mandela made his gratitude clear, saying “We received enormous assistance from the Soviet Union, an assistance which we could not get from the West and Russia should have been the very rst country I visited and I’ve come to pay that debt now.” [15] [16] Russia also has current sources of in uence in Africa, some of which stem from Africans’ frustration with Western assistance. As noted earlier, the Wagner Group/Africa Corps successfully leveraged frustration with Western peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions in the Sahel, convincing several countries in that region to eject Western forces and replace them with Russian mercenaries. As Dan Whitman notes, Russia’s presence and activities are self-serving, but many Africans expect this and are unperturbed by it, preferring naked sel shness to what they see as Western hypocrisy. Whitman argues that Russian narratives appeal especially “to young Africans who are fed up with the Western presence. With justi cation, they see the West as having supported regimes, not people.” Tying Russia’s in uence back to the Soviet Union’s support for African liberation movements, Whitman concludes, “Adding a few lies to a sound anti-colonial narrative has served it well.” [17] [18]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
But there are clear limits to Moscow’s in uence in Africa. Some of these are structural and out of Moscow’s control, and some are a result of its own actions. In the latter category is the fact that Russia focuses on ties with elites and generally ignores the needs of African populations. This is especially true of the Africa Corps, which focuses on regime protection while neglecting the needs of ordinary Africans or committing grave human rights violations against them. A 2025 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) alleges that Russian mercenaries in Africa “regularly shared photos and videos of murder, rape, torture, cannibalism, and desecration of corpses against alleged insurgents and civilians.” [19] The structural reasons for Russia’s limited in uence in Africa mostly devolve from comparing its presence and activities with those of China. Russia may have inherited a slightly deeper reservoir of historical goodwill than did China—the Soviet Union was an earlier and more active supporter of African anti-colonial movements than was the People’s Republic of China. But China has more than made up for this through its contemporary role on the continent. Beijing’s large, broad-based, institutionalized presence in Africa, which encompasses the diplomatic, security, and economic spheres, is seen as a generally positive force among African publics. China has the highest favorability rating of major powers among African publics, with 60% of those surveyed approving of its role and only 19% disapproving. Russia, by comparison, has the lowest favorability rating, with only 36% assessing its role as positive. [20] Aside from the Russian crimes against civilians and support for elites at the expense of African populations, there are two main reasons for the di erence in favorability ratings. First is the size of China’s presence in Africa, which dwarfs Russia’s by any measure. China has embassies in all 54 African countries, while Russia is present in only 39 of them. Chinese aid, trade, and investment are orders of magnitude greater than those of Russia: Beijing’s trade with the continent in 2024 totaled $295 billion compared to only $24.5 billion for Russia. The next reason is that Chinese aid focuses on tangible projects that meet the needs of ordinary Africans. As one African scholar put it, China invests in physical infrastructure projects and nishes them quickly, both of which people like. Any resentment over Chinese activities in Africa often stems from labor practices, which have [22] historically favored bringing in Chinese workers for infrastructure projects rather than hiring Africans. Where Chinese rms do hire Africans, they have been accused of subjecting Africans to substandard working conditions and violating labor laws. [23] [21] In a direct comparison of Russian and Chinese in uence in Africa, the latter is clearly superior. Russia’s reservoir of historical goodwill has proven no match for its present-day activities, which often end up hurting ordinary Africans far more than helping them. And it has proven no match for China’s activities that, despite shortcomings, are seen in a generally positive light. In fact, one African scholar noted that Russia is so far behind China in Africa that it risks not being taken seriously. For a government and people obsessed with being acknowledged as a great power, this may be the ultimate insult. [24]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Russian and Chinese Use of the Instruments of Power in Africa
Having surveyed Russian and Chinese interests and in uence in Africa, this paper now examines how the two advance those interests and build that in uence. Like all states, they do so by using what are commonly known as the instruments of power or instruments of statecraft. Although there are di ering de nitions of what these instruments are, one common framework lists them as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools. Analyzing how Moscow and Beijing deploy and use these instruments in Africa can reveal several things. First, it can help us understand the intensity of Russian and Chinese interests in Africa. For example, if a state deploys all four instruments in signi cant quantities in a certain region, we can infer that this state sees its interests in that region as important or even vital. Examining the instruments of power can also tell us which interests a state considers most important in a region. For example, if a state’s security presence in a given region is far higher than the presence of other instruments, we can infer that the state sees this region primarily in terms of its importance to the state’s security interests. Finally, examining how two di erent states use the instruments of power in a region can reveal clues about which state sees the region as more important.
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Of course, instruments of power are rarely deployed individually. They are most often deployed together, as part of a policy or strategy. In statecraft, as E.H. Carr notes, “power is an indivisible whole; one instrument cannot exist for long in the absence of the others.” This paper de nes the instruments of power as follows: [25]
The represents the power of persuasion. This includes negotiations, oral and written diplomatic communications, as well as the political systems and trajectories of states, including the extent to which their domestic political regime types align. diplomatic instrument [26] The encompasses the e orts of governments to disseminate and collect information in an e ort to tell a government’s story to an audience with the hope of building support for it. informational instrument [27] The includes, but is not limited to, the capabilities inherent in the armed forces and other security services of a state. This may or may not include military operations; arms sales, exercises, and military education and training also comprise the military instrument. For this paper, Russian and Chinese security contractors, like Russia’s Africa Corps, are also included in the military instrument. In the positive sense, this might include trade, economic aid, and foreign direct investment; in the negative sense, this includes actions like sanctions, tari s, embargoes, or even blockades (although this also requires use of the military instrument). economic instrument [29] military instrument [28] The leverages a state’s wealth to in uence others.
Image: Delivery of ten Russian BRDM-2 armored vehicles to Central African Republic. Oct 15, 2020 Image Source: UN Security Council, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Russia
Moscow’s use of the diplomatic instrument in Africa re ects the fact that the continent is of moderate but rising importance to the Kremlin. As noted, Russia operates embassies in 39 of Africa’s 54 countries, and those embassies tend to be smaller than those of China, the US, or other major powers. With its permanent presence limited, Russia has tried to make up for this with high-level diplomatic visits, especially since its full- scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had never visited Africa before 2022, made four visits there in the rst 18 months after the war began. In this period, he visited Egypt, Congo (Brazzaville), Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa (twice), Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Angola, Eritrea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Kenya, Burundi, and Mozambique. Finally, he represented Putin at the August 2023 BRICS Summit in South Africa, which the Russian president skipped due to the arrest warrant issued for him by the International Criminal Court (ICC). [30] [31] Russia’s use of the information instrument has also increased since the start of the war in Ukraine, re ecting Moscow’s desire to see its narrative on the war dominate in the Global South. It also seeks to use the Global South to demonstrate that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed. Some of Moscow’s use of information is directly tied to the operations of Moscow’s mercenaries, and some is more general in scope and tone. Information campaigns tied to mercenary operations have supported Wagner Group deployments in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, as well as later Africa Corps deployments in Burkina Faso and Niger. These campaigns often merged with existing anti-French and anti-colonial themes, although they also contained pro-Russian talking points. This activity has been ampli ed across the Sahel by Russian media operations, including the Africa Initiative, which has recruited and trained pro-Russian in uencers and journalists from several countries across the region. Themes of Russian information operations in these countries include celebrating military rule, undermining popular support for democracy, and portraying Russia as a trusted partner for Africa. Russia increasingly uses arti cial intelligence (AI) to support its information e orts in Africa, using AI-generated videos, fabricated endorsements, and highly coordinated social media ampli cation to raise support for Russia and the regimes it supports. In some cases, this has made leaders like Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré into social media superstars, by “endowing him with impeccable American English and a power of persuasion far exceeding his own.” [32] [33] [34] Russia leads with the military instrument in Africa, closely supported by the informational instrument, which it has employed with increasing intensity since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moscow often attempts to parlay its military activities into economic gains, but otherwise its economic presence in Africa is small, especially compared to China’s.
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Other Russian uses of the information instrument include the establishment of Pushkin Institutes in Africa and providing free education for thousands of Africans per year. Pushkin Institutes promote Russian language and culture abroad, and Moscow now operates them in 22 of the 54 African countries, up from only three before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its o er of free education has likewise risen sharply in the past several years: some 35,000 Africans now study in Russia free of charge. For the current academic year, applicants for these positions rose from 20,000 to 40,000, with Sudan, Guinea, Ghana and Chad seeing the sharpest increases. [35] Moscow’s military presence in Africa is unconventional and sometimes unacknowledged, but still substantial. Russia maintains no military bases in Africa—although it has been in on-again, o -again talks with Sudan on the topic for years—and the Russian military is not a major player on the continent. Still, Moscow uses the military instrument extensively in Africa through its Africa Corps contingent, which is not formally a part of the Russian military but reliably does the Kremlin’s bidding. In fact, squaring the deniability/control circle was a main reason for the creation of the Africa Corps. For years, Kremlin leaders were comfortable granting the Wagner Group extensive autonomy for two reasons. First, it allowed the Russian government to deny involvement in the Group’s more heinous activities by claiming it was a private entity. Second, Putin and those around him were con dent that Putin’s close personal relationship to the Group’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, would keep it under control. These illusions vanished in June 2023, when Prigozhin, angry over what he saw as an intentional lack of support from the Ministry of Defense for Wagner operations in Ukraine, led a march on Moscow. Although Prigozhin’s ghters stopped before reaching the Russian capital, they captured the cities of Rostov and Voronezh, shot down at least seven Russian military aircraft, and killed as many as 29 Russian soldiers. This move sealed Prigozhin’s fate—he died two months later in a plane crash almost certainly orchestrated by the Kremlin—and made it clear to Putin that he needed to rein in his mercenary force, lest it become as dangerous to him as it had long been to Russia’s enemies and ordinary people wherever it operated. The solution was the creation of the Russian Africa Corps. While not formally integrated into the Russian military—thus preserving at least a thin veneer of deniability—the Corps is certainly on a shorter leash than the Wagner Group. [36] Using the same model as Wagner, Africa Corps provides coup-proo ng, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism assistance, military training, and disinformation operations to juntas and authoritarian regimes across the region, including Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea. It pioneered many of these techniques in one of the Wagner Group’s rst major African interventions in Libya, where it arrived in 2019. Based on the Libya model, the Africa Corps now engages in “limited, exible, and nominally deniable interventions” meant to “establish in uence on the cheap and secure lucrative revenue streams, such as from gold mining.” Interestingly, the Africa Corps works both sides of the coup issue. As noted, it o ers coup-proo ng to friendly regimes, but it has also supported popular movements to overthrow regimes it considers unfriendly (i.e., those that are pro-Western) and replaces them with military juntas. These “popularly supported coups” are a new phenomenon that Russia did not create but is happily taking advantage of. [37] [38]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
Activity is not the same as e ectiveness. While the Africa Corps has been active in Africa, there are cascading signs that it has been ine ective at providing security for hire for its client governments and may actually be making things worse. Burkina Faso serves as an example here. Since Russia’s social media star client, President Ibrahim Traoré took power in September 2022, insecurity in Burkina Faso has grown more deadly. As an August 2025 report from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies notes, “fatalities linked to militant Islamist group violence have almost tripled in the past three years, reaching 17,775 deaths. This compares to 6,630 deaths in the three-year period prior to Traoré’s coup.” Violence has also expanded geographically under Traoré: some 165,000 square kilometers of Burkina Faso have seen more violence than before the coup, representing “an intensi cation of militant Islamist presence in northern Burkina Faso and an expansion westward and southward toward the borders of the coastal West African countries of Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire.” The e ect of this intensi cation and expansion of violence, which is also happening in other Russian client states like Mali, is likely to damage Russia’s reputation as a security provider on the continent. [39] [40] Russia’s economic engagement with Africa is narrow and targeted. It focuses on energy, mining, nuclear power development, and arms sales, with deals often tied to political or security arrangements. Although it boasts multibillion-dollar contracts in the mining and energy sectors and has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Egypt and Nigeria, Russia’s overall economic weight in Africa is paltry. According to 2024 gures, Moscow’s trade with African states totals some $25–30 billion, smaller even than Ukraine’s ($41 billion) and far behind China and the US. Russia barely registers as a provider of foreign direct investment, and arms sales, where the Kremlin once led, have seriously eroded since 2020, dropping Russia to the second-largest supplier to sub-Saharan Africa, behind China. [41] [42]
China
Beijing’s use of the instruments of power in Africa is guided by the CCP’s belief in the nexus between security and economic development. China seeks to ensure that insecurity in Africa does not threaten its economic investments to allow those investments to raise the level of economic development in Africa; thereby, China contributes to more stable security conditions. Its use of diplomatic and information instruments complements these goals. Although Africa has long been an important diplomatic space for China, it has made a major diplomatic push there over the last several years. As noted, China maintains an embassy in all 54 African states, compared to 39 for Russia. Since 2007, Chinese o cials have made some 140 trips to Africa, often tied to Belt and Road Initiative projects. For 36 straight years, the Chinese Foreign Minister has made Africa his rst annual trip; this year, the trip took place in early January and included stops in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Lesotho. Even with a four-year hiatus during the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s President Xi Jinping has visited the continent four times since 2015. The primary institution for China’s relations with Africa is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which brings together Chinese and African o cials to discuss trade, development, security, and other topics of mutual interest. Finally, in line with its belief that development and security are linked, and its BRI priorities, Chinese diplomatic visits occur disproportionately in the poorest African countries. [45] [43] [44]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
China’s Confucius Institutes are central to its information strategy in Africa with about 60 operating in 49 African countries. Although they promote Chinese language and culture, the institutes also openly serve Chinese political and economic goals, attracting criticism from both African and Western observers. As one African scholar noted, “They interfere with the academic freedom within universities and indoctrinate students with Chinese political systems that could be seen as authoritarian or undemocratic.” Unsurprisingly, the growth of Confucius Institutes has corresponded with a growth in the number of African students attending Chinese universities, which has risen from less than 2,000 in 2003 to over 81,500 in 2018. [46] [47] The framework for China’s security presence in Africa is the GSI, which seeks to o er an alternative model of security to that o ered by the US and the West, and to address causes of insecurity that threaten China’s economic interests. The Chinese government articulates the goals of the GSI as presenting Beijing as a “dispute arbiter, architect of new regional security frameworks, and trainer of security professionals and police forces in developing countries.” China has become the dominant seller of military equipment to Africa, overtaking Russia, and selling to some 70% of African militaries, with states like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia buying over 90% of their weapons from China. Major items sold include jet trainers, armored personnel carriers, anti-ship missiles, and combat drones. [48] [49] Africa is the location of China’s rst overseas military base, opened in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017, and there have been persistent rumors of another base planned for Equatorial Guinea on Africa’s Atlantic coast. Having bases in both regions would make sense, given China’s integration of its security and economic goals in Africa. Many of its most important BRI projects are in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, both important trade routes but also beset by piracy, terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of mass violence. Of course, a base in Equatorial Guinea could also act as a springboard for greater Chinese naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean, something US policymakers greet with alarm. [50] Like Russia, China has a robust private military and security company (PMSC) presence in Africa. But Chinese and Russian PMSCs operate di erently and have di erent goals. Chinese security rms are generally employed to protect Chinese BRI projects and other investments, and most but not all operate unarmed. With over 10,000 Chinese businesses operating in Africa and some one million Chinese living there, the scale of Beijing’s economic presence—and accompanying security vulnerability—is clear. Estimates suggest that some 3,200 Chinese PMSC personnel operate overseas, with the vast majority of these in Africa: about 2,000 contractors from a single Chinese rm operate in Ethiopia and Kenya alone. The nal two forms of Chinese security presence in Africa are its UN peacekeepers and its police forces. As noted previously, over 80% of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to Africa, and over 32,000 Chinese soldiers have served in UN missions there, the highest number among permanent members of the UN Security Council. Beijing’s police presence in Africa is less benign, serving largely to keep tabs on Chinese citizens living there, and by agreement with many African countries, to extradite them back to China to face punishment. [53] [51] [52]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
China’s presence and power in Africa become clear in the use of the economic instrument. By every economic measure, China dwarfs Russia on the continent. Beijing’s engagement is deep, broad, and focused on the long term with massive investments in infrastructure (BRI), huge trade turnover, and signi cant foreign direct investment (FDI). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the construction and telecoms sectors. China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009, with trade turnover reaching a record $348 billion in 2025. But trade between the two is unbalanced: China generally imports raw materials like crude oil, copper, and cobalt from Africa, and exports nished goods. The trade gures reveal the results of this imbalance, with the continent’s trade de cit with China widening by 64.5% to a record $102 billion in 2025. As they do elsewhere, Chinese imports often compete with locally produced products and drive local manufacturers out of business. [54] [55] [56] [57] Like its trade with Africa, China’s loans and investment there are a double-edged sword. On one hand, Chinese loans and investment have played a crucial role in addressing Africa’s infrastructure de cits through projects like Kenya’s Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway and the Djibouti–Ethiopia Railway, which have enhanced regional connectivity and trade. Chinese loans are often o ered to African countries with few other sources of nancing due to their low credit ratings. To protect these somewhat risky investments, Beijing secures its loans by leveraging natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals to mitigate the risk of default. For example, China has taken oil from Sudan, gold from Tanzania, and copper from Zambia as compensation for unpaid loans. [58] [59] China has not yet seized its Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa, something Western policymakers routinely warn about. Instead, it has acted like other lenders, scaling back its loans to overly debt-burdened clients, extending payment periods, and sometimes lowering interest rates. Debt to China is still a major concern for many African governments. The top ten African debtor countries owe China some $200 billion collectively. Djibouti, despite not being in the top ten in total debt to China, may be the most debt-distressed African state, owing Beijing some 70% of its annual GDP. Finally, China has been criticized for using mostly Chinese labor and for causing environmental damage in Africa. Chinese-operated mines in Africa, for example, have had “detrimental e ects on local ecosystems, including deforestation, soil erosion, and water pollution.” [60] [61] [62]
Conclusion
Russia and China are neither partners nor competitors in Africa. Instead, their interaction there can best be described as compartmentalized: each is aware that the other has interests in Africa and is using a combination of instruments to pursue those interests and build its in uence. Rather than formally cooperate or compete, they generally stay out of each other’s way. Any cooperation that exists is ad hoc, and any competition is limited in scope and has not yet impacted their overall relationship. The two appear to have found an informal division of labor, where China focuses on nances, infrastructure, trade, and technological development, and Russia focuses on arms sales (although China has overtaken it here), regime survival, and parlaying these into what economic gains it can, primarily through resource extraction.
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
This section reviews the main areas where Russian and Chinese interests converge and diverge and draws inferences for their overall relationship. A main area where their interests converge is their shared goal of eroding Western in uence in Africa, but they diverge over how to do this. China prefers to o er alternative models of governance, development, and security to those o ered by the West in the hope that African states will embrace those models and reject Western ones. Russia prefers to undermine Western states and international institutions in Africa without o ering alternatives, except in the case of the Africa Corps, which has arguably caused more chaos than it has eliminated. In essence, China is a builder, and Russia is a disruptor in Africa. Their attitudes toward stability in Africa will be an issue they need to manage moving forward. China needs stability for the long-term return on its economic investments there, but Russia foments instability because it provides opportunities for the Africa Corps. China’s desire for stability could eventually cause it to resent Russia’s role as an agent of chaos on the continent. As dangerous as Russia’s African escapades might be for China over the long term, they o er some short-term bene ts. First, they allow China to retain its image as a win-win partner while Russia pays the reputational and security costs. Next, if chaos drives out Western investment, China stands to gain. An emerging but still manageable divergence exists in two other areas: arms sales and resource extraction. In the former area, Russia has historically been the leader, but the e ects of the Ukraine war and Chinese competition are eroding Moscow’s advantage. The war in Ukraine has revealed the poor performance of Russian military equipment, and sanctions are impacting Russia’s ability to produce enough equipment to replace its losses in Ukraine and make signi cant equipment available for foreign customers. China has been touting its equipment as an alternative by noting it is both cheaper and more readily available. In resource extraction, especially mining and energy deals, China usually wins due to superior resources, but Russia has been trying to compensate via security-for-resources deals. Perhaps the best way to characterize how Russia and China interact in Africa is to view it through African eyes. As Dr. Paul Tembe, a South African scholar, sees it, the two have a “passive, proxy-type alliance.” He continued by noting that, while Beijing and Moscow are not partners in Africa, “at the same time they won’t in the next two decades stab each other in the back.” [63]
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
1. “Mosi-3 (“Will for Peace 2026”) — Strategic Implications for African Security and Geopolitics,” African Security Analysis, January 12, 2026, https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/mosi-3-will-for- peace-2026-strategic-implications-for-african-security-and-geopolitics ↑
2.
, “For Africa, China’s FM Visit Signals a Predictable Partnership in an
Uncertain World,” Huiyi Chen and Aishat Adebayo The Diplomat,
January 29, 2026,
https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/for-africa-chinas-
fm-visit-signals-a-predictable-partnership-in-an-uncertain-world/ ↑ 3. “African nations, Russia convene in Cairo to draft 2026–2029 strategic action plan,” February 5, 2026,
Daily News Egypt, https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2025/12/20/african-nations-russia-convene-in-
cairo-to-draft-2026-2029-strategic-action-plan/ ↑ 4. “Russia as a Great Power”, VCIOM, April 10, 2024, ; “One in two Russian citizens sees country as great power, survey shows — leading pollster,” TASS Russian News Agency, February 29, 2024, https://wciom.com/press-release/russia-as-a-great- power https://tass.com/society/1753491 ↑ 5. Christopher Faulker and Raphael Parens, “Russia’s Hollow Promises: Mali’s Fuel Blockade Exposes the Myth of Moscow’s Power,” Delphi Global Research Center, November 12, 2025, https://www.delphigrc.org/research/russia-s-hollow-promises-mali-s-fuel-blockade-exposes-the- myth-of-moscow-s-power ↑ 6. Joe Inwood and Jake Tacchi, “Wagner in Africa: How the Russian mercenary group has rebranded,” February 20, 2024, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230 ↑ 7. Ibid ↑ 8. “”Russia nances war against Ukraine through “blood gold” from Africa,” Center for Countering Disinformation, December 1, 2025, russia nances war against Ukraine through "blood gold" from Africa | Центр протидії дезінформації ↑ 9. Abraham White and Leo Holtz, “Figure of the week: African countries’ votes on the UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” March 9, 2022, Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ gure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution- condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ ↑ 10. David D. Lee, “Ukraine says over 1,400 Africans recruited to ght for Russia in war,” Al Jazeera, November 8, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/8/ukraines-fm-says-over-1400-africans-recruited- to- ght-for-russia-in-war ↑ 11. Dan Whitman, “A Movie We’ve Seen Before: Russia’s Pitch for Africa,” Delphi Global Research Center, January 12, 2026, https://www.delphigrc.org/research/a-movie-we-ve-seen-before-russia-s-pitch-for- africa ↑ 12. Tim Clark, “Opportunity In Africa: Growth Potential Abounds—With The Right Strategy,” June 3, 2025, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2025/06/03/opportunity-in-africa-growth-potential-abounds- with-the-right-strategy/ ↑ 13. Paul Nantulya, “China’s Policing Models Make Inroads in Africa,” May 22, 2023, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinas-policing-models-make-inroads-in-africa/ ↑ 14. Chen Qingqing, “China-Africa security forum injects positive energy into global peace,” August 28, 2023, Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1297125.shtml ↑
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
15. Dan Whitman, “A Movie We’ve Seen Before.” ↑ 16. Ibid. ↑ 17. Ibid. ↑ 18. Ibid. ↑ 19. Thomas Naadi, “Russian mercenaries accused of cold-blooded killings in Mali — BBC speaks to eyewitnesses,” BBC, November 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crmx7x3yjyko ↑ 20. Eric Olander, “China Tops Favorability Rankings in Africa, Outpacing U.S. and EU, New Survey Shows,” June 5, 2025, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/06/05/china-most-favored-global-power-in-africa/ ↑ 21. Defense Analysis Team, “The New Scramble for Africa: How Russia and China Are Reshaping the Continent,” Defense.info, August 31, 2025, https://defense.info/highlight-of-the-week/the-new- scramble-for-africa-how-russia-and-china-are-reshaping-the-continent/ ↑ 22. Dr. Woldeamlak Bewket, Professor at Addis Ababa University, interview with the author, August 29, 2022. ↑ 23. Sergio Carciotto and Ringisai Chikohomero, “Chinese labour practices in six southern African countries,” Institute for Security Studies, August, 2022, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono- 207.pdf ↑ 24. Dr. Patrick Maluki, Professor at the University of Nairobi, interview with the author, September 1, 2022. ↑ 25. Edward Hallett Carr, – (Harper-Collins, 1964), 1–21. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919 1939: Introduction to the Study of International Relations ↑ 26. D. Robert Worley, (University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 286. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System ↑ 27. Ibid, 278. ↑ 28. Ibid, 277. ↑ 29. Ibid, 281. ↑ 30. Diplomat posted to the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, name withheld by request, interview with the author, September 2, 2022. ↑ 31. Boris Bondarev, “Lavrov Returns to Africa,” 20, no. 91 (June 6, 2023): Eurasia Daily Monitor https://jamestown.org/program/lavrov-returns-to-africa/ ↑ 32. Will Brown, “The bear and the bot farm: Countering Russian hybrid warfare in Africa,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-bear-and-the-bot-farm- countering-russian-hybrid-warfare-in-africa/ ↑ 33. Mohammed Dahiru Lawal, “Inside the AI-driven propaganda elevating Burkina Faso’s leader, Ibrahim Traore,” Dubawa, June 16, 2025, https://dubawa.org/inside-the-ai-driven-propaganda-elevating-burkina- fasos-leader-ibrahim-traore/ ↑ 34. Dan Whitman, “A Movie We’ve Seen Before.” ↑ 35. Ibid. ↑ 36. Stefano D’Urso, “Many Questions Still Unanswered After Wagner’s Attempted ‘March On Moscow,’” The Aviationist, June 27, 2023, https://theaviationist.com/2023/06/27/wagners-march-on-moscow/ ↑ 37. Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, “The Right Way for America to Counter Russia in Africa,” July 9, 2024, Foreign A airs, https://www.foreigna airs.com/africa/right-way-america-counter-russia-africa ↑ 38. Dan Whitman, “A Movie We’ve Seen Before.” ↑
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Russia and China in Africa: Interests, In uence, and Instruments of Power
39. “A Growing Divergence of Security Narratives in Burkina Faso,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 26, 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/security-narratives-burkina-faso/ ↑ 40. Ibid. ↑ 41. Dan Whitman, “A Movie We’ve Seen Before.” ↑ 42. , “Russia-Africa Ties Catch Global Tailwinds in 2025,” Riddle, December 18, 2025, Ivan U. Klyszcz https://ridl.io/russia-africa-ties-catch-global-tailwinds-in-2025/ ↑ 43. , “Wang Yi’s First African Tour After FOCAC9 Sets the Tone for Africa-China Relations in 2025,” January 13, 2025, Huiyi Chen and Aishat Adebayo The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/wang-yis- rst- african-tour-after-focac9-sets-the-tone-for-africa-china-relations-in-2025/ ↑ 44. Asia Paci c Task Force, “Wang Yi’s 2026 Africa Tour: Strengthening Strategic Ties,” Beyond the Horizon, January 13, 2026, https://behorizon.org/wang-yis-2026-africa-tour-strengthening-strategic-ties/ ↑ 45. Eric Olander, China Tops Favorability Rankings in Africa” ↑ 46. , “How China promotes its language and culture in Africa,” Deutsche Welle, September 27, 2025, . Martina Schwikowski How China promotes its language and culture in Africa ↑ 47. Ibid. ↑ 48. Mercy A. Kuo, “China-Russia Cooperation in Africa and the Middle East,” April 3, 2023, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-russia-cooperation-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/ ↑ 49. “China Becomes Africa’s Top Weapons Supplier, But Motive and Quality Stir Debate,” , July 23, 2024, . supplier-but-motive-and-quality-stir- debate/#:~:text=At%20least%2021%20countries%20in,on%20East%20and%20Central%20Africa ↑ 50. Africa Defense Forum https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/china-becomes-africas-top-weapons- , “China and Equatorial Guinea: Why Their New ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ Ovigwe Eguegu
The Diplomat,
Matters,”
June 10, 2024,
https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/china-and-equatorial-guinea-
. why-their-new-comprehensive-strategic-partnership- matters/#:~:text=The%20reports%20of%20a%20possible,next%20to%20an%20oil%20re nery ↑ 51. Michaël Tanchum, “China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in- africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/ ↑ 52. Lorenzo Suadoni, “The Discreet Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies: Implications for Africa,” Atlas Institute of International A airs, November 30, 2025, https://atlasinstitute.org/the-discreet-rise-of- . chinese-private-security-companies-implications-for- africa/#:~:text=Estimates%20suggest%20that%2020%20to,(Carnegie%20Endowment%2C%202020) ↑ 53. Chen Qingqing, “China-Africa security forum injects positive energy into global peace” ↑ 54. “China’s Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates E orts to Rebalance Trade,” China-Global South Project, February 9, 2026, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/the-2025-china-africa-trade- rundown/ ↑ 55. Fabrizio Minniti, “China’s in uence in Africa: Challenges and strategic implications,” NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy, n.d., https://nrdc-ita.nato.int/newsroom/insights/chinas-in uence-in-africa- challenges-and-strategic-implications ↑ 56. “China’s Export Surge to Africa in 2025 Complicates E orts to Rebalance Trade.” ↑ 57. and , “Chinese Engagement with Africa: a RAND Research Primer,” RAND, July 15, 2025, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo Cortez A. Cooper III https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2989-1.html ↑
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