The California Trial Penalty

From NACDL and CACJ

THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack

A Comprehensive Analysis of Causes, Consequences, and Options for Reform in California

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

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This publication is available online at www.NACDL.org/CaliforniaTrialPenalty

Copyright © 2026 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. It may be reproduced, provided that no charge is imposed, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) is acknowledged as the original publishers and the copyright holders. For any other form of reproduction, please contact NACDL for permission.

THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack

C. Melissa Owen President, NACDL

Marketa Sims President, CACJ

Lisa Monet Wayne Executive Director, NACDL

Tara Da Re Managing Director, CACJ

Kyle O’Dowd Deputy Director, NACDL

TRIAL PENALTY TASK FORCE Jacqueline Goodman and Martín Sabelli Chairs

Stephen Munkelt Nathan Pysno

Donald Salzman Robert Warnement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND THE NACDL FOUNDATION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

6

ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

6

FOREWORD 

7

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

9

INTRODUCTION 

10

The Disappearance of Jury Trials in California Since 1980 

10

The Impact of the Disappearance of Jury Trials 

11

THE TRIAL PENALTY: RESEARCH AND BACKGROUND 

12

CALIFORNIA’S DISAPPEARING TRIAL 

15

SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT CALIFORNIA SENTENCING PROVISIONS 

16

DEFINING THE TRIAL PENALTY: PRACTITIONER EXPERIENCES AND SURVEY RESULTS 

17

Survey and Interview Methodology 

17

Defense Counsel Perspective: Trial Penalty And Coercion 

18

Existence and Occurrence of the Trial Penalty 

18

Coercion 

19

Defense Counsel Perspective: Case Characteristics and Defendant Demographics 

21

Defense Counsel Perspective: Manifestation of the Trial Penalty & Policy Impacts 

23

Procedural Issues 

25

Prosecutors’ Perspective: Prosecutor Survey Results 

27

Resolution of Cases by Plea 

27

Policies and Practices for Plea Offers 

28

The Trial Penalty 

31

ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED FROM CALIFORNIA COURTS AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 

33

Data Collection Efforts And Data Analysis Methodology 

34

Public records data requests and responses 

34

Usable data sets 

35

Prevalence of Guilty Pleas Versus Trials 

37

Penal Code Analysis 

38

Probability of Misdemeanor Versus Felony Conviction 

38

Methodology for Identifying a Trial Penalty Using Sentencing Comparisons by Penal Code 

39

Statistical Analyses of Sentencing Duration Across Seven Counties 

39

Sentencing Comparison Snapshots by Discrete California Penal Code Subsections 

40

Analysis of Penal Code Subsections by Felony Trials 

40

Analysis of Penal Code Subsections by Number of Misdemeanor Trials 

41

Analysis of Penal Code Subsections by Largest Trial Penalty — Felonies 

41

Analysis of Penal Codes Subsections by Largest Trial Penalty — Misdemeanors 

42

Life Sentence Probability Comparison 

43

2015 SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER PLEA OFFER AND TRIAL DATA ANALYSIS 

44

Felony Trial Data Analysis 

44

Felony Trial Penalty Cases 

46

Misdemeanor Trial Data Analysis 

48

Misdemeanor DUI Trial Penalty Cases 

49

Miscellaneous Misdemeanor Trial Penalty Cases 

50

CONCLUSION 

51

PRINCIPLES AND FINDINGS 

53

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

54

Restore Respect for the Right to Trial 

54

Don’t Allow Sentencing to Be Based on the Decision to Exercise the Right to Trial 

54

Restore Respect for the Presumption of Innocence 

54

Prohibit the Use, and Impact, of Pretrial Detention, or Conditions of Release, on an Individual’s Right to Trial  54

Restore Judicial Independence and Judicial Discretion to Fit the Punishment to the Crime 

54

Eliminate or Reform Mandatory Sentencing Schemes 

54

Protect Judicial Independence and Require Proportionate Sentencing Directives 

55

Eliminate Barriers to Post-Conviction Innocence Claims for Individuals Who Pled Guilty as a Result of Coercive Plea Bargaining 

55

Authorize Judicial “Second Looks” and Expand the Availability of Clemency and Compassionate Release  55

Restore Effective Assistance of Counsel Before Plea Bargaining 

55

Guarantee Informed and Voluntary Pleas by Ensuring Effective Assistance of Counsel Before Plea Bargaining  55

Restore Transparency and Accountability 

55

Require Courts to Impose the Least Restrictive Appropriate Disposition 

55

Require Transparency in Charging, Plea Bargaining, and Sentencing 

55

Establish a Criminal Justice Data and Accountability Dashboard 

55

ENDNOTES 

56

APPENDIX 1: DEFENSE COUNSEL SURVEY 

61

APPENDIX 2: PROSECUTOR SURVEY 

84

APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLES OF OUTREACH LETTERS 

105

ABOUT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND THE NACDL FOUNDATION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) is the preeminent organization in the United States advancing the goal of the criminal defense bar to ensure justice and due process for persons charged with a crime or wrongdoing. NACDL envisions a society where all individuals receive fair, rational, and humane treatment within the criminal legal system. NACDL’s mission is to serve as a leader, alongside diverse coalitions, in identifying and reforming flaws and inequities in the criminal justice system, redressing systemic racism, and ensuring that its members and others in the criminal defense bar are fully equipped to serve all accused persons at the highest level. NACDL’s over 10,000 direct members — and its 90 state, local and international affiliates — include private criminal defense lawyers, public defenders, active U.S. military defense counsel, and law professors committed to promoting fairness in America’s criminal legal system. Representing thousands of criminal defense attorneys who know firsthand the inadequacies of the current system, NACDL is recognized domestically and internationally for its expertise on criminal justice policies and practices. Curtailment of the trial penalty and elimination of coercion in plea bargaining are core advocacy objectives of NACDL.

In 2018, NACDL published a groundbreaking report on the federal trial penalty — The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It (July 10, 2018). In 2021, NACDL and the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers published a report analyzing the trial penalty in the state of New York — The New York State Trial Penalty: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack (Mar. 26, 2021). In early 2026, NACDL, the Connecticut Office of Chief Public Defender, and the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association published The Trial Penalty in Connecticut: Are People Being Punished for Exercising Their Constitutional Rights?, a report on the trial penalty in Connecticut state cases. NACDL recognizes that the trial penalty is one of the most serious problems in the nation’s criminal legal system, one that perpetuates injustice and disparity. The NACDL Foundation for Criminal Justice (NFCJ) is a 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofit organized to preserve and promote the core values of the American criminal legal system guaranteed by the Constitution — among them access to effective counsel, due process, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to a jury trial, and fair sentencing. The NFCJ supports NACDL’s efforts to promote its mission through resources, education, training and advocacy tools for the public, the nation’s criminal defense bar, and the clients they serve.

ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (CACJ) is an NACDL affiliate made up of criminal defense lawyers, both public and private, along with allied professionals throughout the most populous state in the nation. CACJ defends the rights of persons accused of crimes, as well as the interests of those convicted. CACJ’s work centers on empowering defense attorneys with the support they need to champion justice, whether through extensive training programs, active legislative advocacy, or the sharing of resources and insights among its members to ensure that every individual receives the rigorous and fair defense to which they are entitled under the state and federal constitution.

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

FOREWORD

The Honorable LaDoris Hazzard Cordell Judge of the Superior Court, Santa Clara County, California (Ret.) Author of Her Honor: My Life on the Bench. . . What Works, What’s Broken, and How to Change It

In 2012, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy lauded the practice of plea bargaining, writing for the court, “to note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it. The potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties. 1 Ah, Justice Kennedy, would that it were so and that the prevalence of pleas in the criminal justice system reflected a reality of fair-minded prosecutors and well- represented accused negotiating for mutual benefit. Unfortunately, my experience as a Superior Court trial judge, and this report, speak of a very different reality. For nearly 20 years (1982-2001), I was a California trial court judge who presided over hundreds, if not thousands of plea bargains, but only a handful of jury trials. My situation was not unique. Throughout the Golden State, trial judges dispose of the vast majority of criminal cases with guilty pleas, while knowing full well that many, if not most of those individuals who do not accept plea bargains and insist on going to trial, will pay a price—a trial penalty. The constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Yet, I routinely saw prosecutors overcharge defendants only to promise to drop some charges in return for their

guilty pleas. And I heard judges declare to defendants that should they go to trial and be convicted, they would face harsher sentences than had they pled guilty. Sadly, the trial penalty is alive and well in California. As noted in the groundbreaking report, The California Trial Penalty: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack, recent research shows the significant use of pleas to resolve criminal cases, with approximately 97% of federal criminal convictions resulting from pleas, 2 and, in certain jurisdictions, resolving all of their criminal cases through pleas, 3 and that phenomena is mirrored in California where, in the most recent data from 2023/2024, just 2.2% of felony dispositions resulted from jury trials. The extensive use of pleas to resolve criminal cases undermines the important role that jury trials play in our criminal justice system. The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice Foundation (CACJ Foundation) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), authors of The California Trial Penalty: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack, have given to policy makers, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys an important, in- depth analysis of the trial penalty that has almost disappeared jury trials in California. As importantly, they have given us recommendations that will disappear the trial penalty entirely from our criminal legal system.

Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134 (2012).

1.

2. See Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, The Trial Penalty: the Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It. at 14 (2018). 3. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Crim. Just. Section, 2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report (2023), at 6 (hereinafter “2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report”).

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is the result of a multi-year collaboration of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (CACJ) as well as a dedicated team of pro bono lawyers and data analysts. The project team was led by Jacqueline Goodman, former President of CACJ; Stephen Munkelt, CACJ’s longtime Executive Director (now retired); Martín Sabelli, former President of NACDL; Nathan Pysno, Director of Procedural Justice & Senior Counsel at NACDL; and Donald P. Salzman and Robert W. Warnement, both of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, the team’s pro bono counsel. Other members of the Skadden team who made significant contributions to the report included Khalil N. Maalouf, Elisa M. Klein, Brian Bak, Christopher Mohr, Samantha Lasley, Samuel Clark-Clough, Drew O’Gwynn, Anika Deodhor, Ava Boghosian, Jacob Callahan, Harry Whitman, and Beverly Freidenrich. We are also grateful to those who contributed their time and expertise including Belinda Escobosa, Mia Yamamoto, Manohar Raju, Brendon Woods, Allison Zuvela, Martina Avalos, Aleem Raja, and Norman Reimer, former Executive Director of NACDL. Special thanks are owed to Patricia Lee of the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office for her hard work and valuable contributions, as well as to Martin Schwartz, former Orange County Public Defender (now retired), Yotam Shem-Tov, Graham Donath, and Arlene Speiser.

We gratefully acknowledge the many county courts, prosecutors’ offices, and public defender offices, the Judicial Council, and the hundreds of private defenders and prosecutors that responded to our records requests and inquiries and provided the data, without which this report would not have been possible. We extend particular thanks to Toni Hoechlin and Sarah Goodman, whose careful work collating data and coordinating the public records requests at the heart of this report was indispensable, and to Ryan Jones, Natalia Romero and Daisy Loya for their valued assistance. The Task Force is profoundly grateful for the expert support it received in the form of invaluable pro bono data analysis from a highly qualified team of experts at a premier consulting firm. At NACDL, we thank Lisa M. Wayne, Kyle O’Dowd, Shuli Carroll, and Julian Giles for their contributions to this report. We honor the memory of Jeff Adachi (1959–2019), Public Defender of the City and County of San Francisco. Two decades ago, he began collecting the data that would come to form part of the empirical foundation of this study—work he undertook on his own initiative, and which we discovered only later. We are proud to carry on his legacy of defending the accused and championing the constitutional right to trial.

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Jury trials have all but vanished in California and across the country. What we have instead isn’t the system of trials the Framers imagined. Our criminal legal system has become an assembly line of plea deals. And there’s a name for what’s driving it: the “trial penalty”— the gap, often a wide and punishing one, between the sentence someone gets after pleading guilty and the sentence they would get for exercising their right to a trial. Since 2018, NACDL has been tracking this penalty in the federal system and in state systems across the country. This report is about the trial penalty in California state cases. Let’s be clear about what’s at stake. The trial penalty doesn’t just punish people for using their right to trial— it chips away at it. And because guilty pleas almost always require the accused to give up claims that their constitutional rights were violated, it quietly undermines the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments too. It also takes something away from all of us: the public’s ability to see how our courts and prosecutors are actually doing their jobs — something the Framers cared about deeply. In 2021, NACDL and CACJ created a Task Force of pro bono lawyers and data analysts to examine the trial penalty in California, its causes, and potential solutions. Over five years, the Task Force gathered and analyzed a decade of data from more than 1.5 million records statewide. Based on this data, the Task Force identified ten policy recommendations to limit and reverse the trial penalty’s damage to the individual and public rights the Constitution guarantees. The Task Force studied the problem using both subjective and objective data. First, the Task Force conducted a statewide survey of criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors which found that nine in ten California defense lawyers believe defendants are penalized for exercising their right to trial. The survey also found that some prosecutors held that view, but far less uniformly than did defense counsel.

The quantitative data told the same story. Drawing on sentencing outcomes from more than 1.5 million criminal cases in 14 of California’s 58 counties over ten years, the Task Force found that defendants are punished harshly for going to trial—in both felony and misdemeanor cases alike. In six counties with sufficient data for statistical comparison, felony defendants convicted at trial received sentences roughly three times longer than those who pled guilty, while in one rural county there was no disparity between the average sentences after guilty pleas and trials. In those counties, misdemeanor defendants convicted at trial fared even worse, with average sentences ranging between two-and-a-half times to a staggering 22 times longer than those for defendants who pled. Only one rural outlier county broke the pattern, with plea sentences running slightly longer than the sentences for defendants who went to trial. This differential represents a substantial trial penalty and explains why criminal trials have virtually vanished from California’s courts. In 1979-80, roughly 12.4% of felony cases in the Superior Courts in California went to trial. Less than 20 years later, by 1997-1998, the figure had fallen to just 4%. Since then, even that reduced number has been cut nearly in half. In 2023-24, just 2.2% of felony convictions in the California Superior Courts came from trial verdicts. Unsurprisingly, the data documenting the disappearance of misdemeanor trials are starker still—an astounding 99.2% of misdemeanor convictions are the result of pleas. Fewer than 1% of misdemeanor cases go to trial. Here’s what we want people to understand: none of this had to happen this way. The trial penalty isn’t some natural, unavoidable feature of our justice system. It’s the product of choices, made by people, at every level of state and local government. And choices can be unmade. That’s why the Task Force put together ten policy recommendations: to help restore the right to trial to the people of California.

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, crime rates in California have dropped substantially 1 and our prison population has soared. 2 During the same 45-year period, jury trials have all but vanished from California, leaving in their place an assembly line of pleas rather than the system of trials envisioned by the Framers. Legal professionals and observers attribute the disappearance of trials to the “trial penalty”—the substantial and often extreme difference between the sentence received pursuant to a guilty plea and the sentence received after trial.

NACDL has studied the trial penalty across the country and, through this report, in California. NACDL has found that, across the country and in California, many factors contribute to the trial penalty, including mandatory sentencing, highly punitive sentencing, abuse of pre- trial detention, underfunding of public defense systems, and systemic racism. 3 This Report endeavors to identify the policy choices that drive the trial penalty in order to propose reforms that might restore the system of trials established in the Constitution to protect individual liberty and limit government power.

The Disappearance of Jury Trials in California Since 1980 While the reduction in trials has occurred in both misdemeanor and felony cases, the plunging felony trial rate over 45 years illustrates the evisceration of the right to trial. As reflected below, felony trial rates have plummeted approximately 83% since 1980, calling into question the integrity of an adversarial criminal legal system based on the constitutional premises that the criminally accused can challenge prosecutorial power and that the public can oversee this process as jurors serving in public trials. As the following charts demonstrate, felony trial rates dropped from 12.4% in fiscal year 1979/80 to 4.0% in 1997/98 to 2.2% in fiscal year 2023/24, representing a reduction of more than 67% over the first two decades and 83% over all four decades: 4

1979/1980 Other Dispositions of

1979/1980 Disposed Felony Cases 5 51,190

1979/1980 Guilty Pleas in Disposed Felony Cases 38,631 (75.5%)

1979/1980 Trials in Disposed Felony Cases 6,338 (12.4%)

Felony Cases 6,221 (12.1%)

1997/1998 Felony Dispositions 6 146,570

1997/1998 Felony Guilty Pleas 132,742 (90.5%)

1997/1998 Trials in Felony Cases 5,880 (4.0%)

1997/1998 Other Felony Dispositions 8,926 (6.0%)

2023/2024 Other Dispositions of

2023/2024 Disposed Felony Cases 7 123,063

2023/2024 Guilty Pleas in Disposed Felony Cases 89,440 (72.6%)

2023/2024 Trials in Disposed Felony Cases 2,682 (2.2%)

Felony Cases 30,941 (25.1%) 8

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

The Impact of the Disappearance of Jury Trials The extensive use of guilty pleas comes at a significant cost to criminal defendants, who are required in nearly all circumstances to waive their fundamental constitutional rights as a condition of pleading guilty—these include not only their right to a trial but also their Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to seek pretrial release; to obtain discovery, receive exculpatory evidence and meaningfully investigate; to challenge unlawfully obtained evidence; and even to appeal. The waiver of these fundamental constitutional rights, and the absence of transparency inherent in a public trial, not only harms defendants but also removes the public’s opportunity to check government overreach and abuse of individual rights—abuses that trials are designed to expose. The driving force behind an individual’s decision to accept a plea rather than pursue a trial is the trial penalty. 9 The trial penalty refers to the substantial difference between the sentences received by those convicted through guilty pleas and the greater sentences, on average, imposed on those convicted at trial. The potential for significantly longer and stricter sentences acts as a strong deterrent to an individual’s exercise of their constitutional rights, and such disparate outcomes suggest that the sentence prosecutors recommend after trial is a punishment for exercising those rights, rather than an accurate reflection of a defendant’s culpability. Simply put, criminal defendants are often coerced into pleading guilty rather than exercising their right to trial, given the outsized risk that conviction at trial poses.

This report of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice Foundation (CACJ Foundation) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) explores the trial penalty in California. In June 2021, the California Trial Penalty Project Task Force (the Task Force), a joint effort between the CACJ Foundation and NACDL, began a process to evaluate the extent and impact of the trial penalty in the California criminal legal system. This report explores those concerns on the basis of surveys of the criminal defense community and of prosecutors; Public Records Act requests and records requests pursuant to court rules; practitioner interviews; and analysis of data on case processing, convictions and guilty plea practices. The report begins with an overview of prior research and reporting on the scope and extent to which pleas are used in criminal proceedings in federal and state courts. It then examines the key drivers of the trial penalty in California, supported by survey responses and interviews from defense attorneys across the state and, to a significantly lesser extent, from prosecutors. In addition to the qualitative data, the report offers a quantitative analysis of the trial penalty through a review of conviction and sentencing data provided by the California courts, district attorney offices, and a public defender agency. Finally, the report provides policy recommendations to reduce the harm of the trial penalty and to allow individuals charged with criminal offenses in California to more freely exercise their constitutional rights.

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

THE TRIAL PENALTY: RESEARCH AND BACKGROUND

The decrease in criminal trials in California is not an isolated occurrence. Over the past 45 years, criminal trials in the United States have withered from a fairly common phenomena in 1980 when about one in five federal convictions resulted from trials to only about three percent today. 10 Recent research shows the significant use of pleas to resolve criminal cases, with approximately 97% of federal criminal convictions resulting from pleas, 11 with certain jurisdictions resolving all of their criminal cases through pleas. 12 The extensive use of pleas to resolve criminal cases undermines the important role that jury trials play in our criminal justice system. Concerns about the near disappearance of criminal jury trials have been elevated as a result of numerous reports over the past decade highlighting the negative effects that coerced pleas have on both criminal defendants and the public’s oversight of prosecutors and law enforcement. In 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published “An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty,” which analyzed the trial penalty in federal drug cases. The report found that the “average sentence of federal drug offenders convicted after trial was three times higher (16 years) than that received after a guilty plea (5 years and 4 months).” 13 HRW attributed these harsh penalties and the overall disappearance of trials to the essentially unchecked discretion of prosecutors during the charging and plea offer phases and to “egregiously severe sentencing laws.” 14 The threat of such severe penalties after trial inevitably pressures criminal defendants to take pleas, 15 which has led to the virtual disappearance of criminal jury trials. 16 As one prosecutor bluntly stated: “The key function of the trial penalty is to encourage pleas.” 17 According to HRW, “this historically low rate of trials reflects an unbalanced and unhealthy criminal justice system.” 18 In July 2018, the NACDL identified similar issues in its report “The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It.” The report found that federal criminal defendants in non-drug prosecutions—even those who were actually innocent—were frequently coerced into pleading guilty because the potential penalty associated with exercising their constitutional right

to trial was simply too great. According to the report, as of 2018, a trial “now occurs in less than 3% of state and federal criminal cases.” NACDL found that additional factors contributed to the disappearance of the trial, including prosecutorial discretion, informational inequalities between prosecutors and defendants, rigid federal Sentencing Guidelines and an inability or unwillingness on the part of judges to exercise their discretion at sentencing. While the promise of a lesser sentence is a potentially appropriate aspect of the plea negotiation process, “the gap between post-trial and post-plea sentences can be so wide” that it acts as an “overwhelming influence in a defendant’s consideration of a plea deal.” The report also noted that the immense pressure to plead guilty allows prosecutors to convince criminal defendants to agree to “all-or-nothing agreements,” which waive important rights like the ability to challenge the legality of the evidence obtained against them. In March 2021, NACDL and the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NYSACDL”) published a report on the trial penalty in New York State, “The New York State Trial Penalty: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack,” which included a survey of more than three hundred criminal defense attorneys from across the state and a statistical analysis of a sample of 79 criminal convictions in Manhattan. The report found that 94% of practitioners in the state agreed that the trial penalty plays a role in criminal practice in New York State, and that the trial penalty manifested in longer sentences after trial compared to earlier plea offers, with defendants being forced to waive various appellate rights and the ability to challenge the government’s case through motion practice to obtain more favorable pleas. The data analysis supported the observations of practitioners, showing that in 66% of defendants in the sample experienced a trial penalty and that increased plea offers were associated with increased eventual sentences (e.g., a plea offer of 5 years was associated, after conviction at trial, with a sentence of 7.5 years and a plea offer of 20 years was associated with a sentence of 28 years). The report also found that the trial penalty is driven by numerous factors, including prosecutorial practices such as aggressive charging, judicial pressure to plead guilty, and the prospect

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

of severe criminal penalties, sentencing enhancements and mandatory minimums should a defendant proceed to trial, as well as defense counsels’ excessive caseloads contributing to the pressure on defendants to take pleas and forgo exercising their statutory and constitutional rights because their defense counsel did not have the time and resources to mount a potential meritorious defense. In February 2023, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section’s Plea Bargain Task Force published a report, “2023 Plea Bargain Task Force Report,” to analyze and address persistent criticism of the plea bargain system in the United States. The report found that while the benefits of plea bargaining (managing limited judicial resources, incentivizing defendants’ cooperation with the government, providing clear and certain resolution of criminal proceedings and providing alternatives for defendants to avoid some of the most severe aspects of the criminal system) in moderation may have merit, the overuse of pleas undermines fundamental values of the criminal legal system. In particular, the report highlighted that “defendants—including innocent defendants—are sometimes coerced into taking pleas and surrendering their right to trial.” Further, the report noted that “the integrity of the criminal justice system is negatively affected by the sheer number of cases resolved by pleas” and that misconduct by police and the government often goes unchecked because cases resolved by pleas do not proceed to pretrial hearings where such misconduct would be litigated. The report highlights that the “loss of trials in favor of plea bargains is a profound loss for civic engagement” and that jury trials provide “critical oversight” to the criminal justice system, remaining “one of the only ways for citizens to shape how prosecutors enforce laws” and that the “voice of the community is almost entirely lost in a system dominated by pleas.” Further, the trial penalty can fail to discourage police misconduct, by shielding police actions from the public scrutiny of a trial. By encouraging pleas early in the trial process, police are insulated from any accountability for their day-to-day, street-level decisions that might arise through suppression hearings and trial proceedings. Further, pleas often require the defendant to waive their right to pursue civil actions for potential police misconduct, preventing further public scrutiny of police actions. 19 In March 2026, NACDL, in conjunction with the Connecticut Office of Chief Public Defender and Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, published “The Trial Penalty in Connecticut: Are People Being Punished for Exercising Their Constitutional Rights?” 20 This statewide study of the trial penalty in Connecticut over a 5-year period compared the sentences in criminal cases that were tried to verdicts of guilty to the best plea offer in the same case. For this

report, data analysis was performed by the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy, School of Public Policy, University of Connecticut. This study found that defendants experienced a trial penalty in 62% of convictions. Among all cases with a trial penalty, the average trial penalty was a stunning 14.6 years. Post-trial sentences were roughly 1.5 times longer than guilty plea sentences. These studies document that, because prosecutors and police almost never have to prove that arrests, prosecution decisions, and convictions are justified and supported by the evidence, there is little incentive against over-policing, particularly in low-income communities and communities of color. Indeed, a 2022 study of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining in Philadelphia engaged in a three-pronged approach of plea bargain policy review, interviews and surveys of both assistant district attorneys (“ADAs”) and defendants who accepted pleas, and case data analysis as well as detailed review of sample cases, and concluded that not only do ADAs feel that they exercise wide discretion in the plea bargaining process, but also there do not seem to be many official mechanisms for checking decision- making after a plea bargain is accepted. 21 The study also found that the ADAs surveyed acknowledged that they received limited training on plea bargaining. 22 Numerous studies establish the devastating impact of over-policing on these communities. 23 As a result, advocates against discriminatory policing outcomes identify a lack of accountability with respect to prosecutorial discretion, and recommend that “prosecutors should state their reasons for plea offers on the record to create transparency, and should be required to collect and share data about plea offers in order to expose any disparities.” 24 Research has also confirmed that defendants’ fear of a lengthier sentence post-trial is well founded. One study, based on all federal criminal cases from 2006 to 2008, found that those who exercised their right to trial received sentences that were 64% longer than similarly situated individuals who pled guilty prior to trial. 25 Accordingly, the study found that because trials pose significant risks of materially longer sentences, defendants are dissuaded from putting the government to its proof, and as a result, prosecutors can “adjudicate both criminal culpability and the magnitude of any punishment largely unfettered by concerns about the likelihood that the defendant might be found not guilty at trial.” 26 These and other studies 27 paint a Kafkaesque portrait of the plea “negotiation” process for criminal defendants, particularly for those who are innocent but nonetheless choose to plead guilty to avoid the potential of a disproportionate sentence after trial should they be convicted. 28

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

The critiques of these aspects of guilty plea resolutions span the ideological and political spectrum. In 2019, the Federal Sentencing Reporter journal dedicated a double issue to the trial penalty. Critiques of the practice came in from all quarters across the ideological gamut, including the ACLU, Right on Crime, the Cato Institute, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, The Charles Koch Institute and Americans for Prosperity. Additionally, a coalition of advocates and groups from across the political spectrum and including prosecutors, defense lawyers, and academics has formed that is committed to mitigating the trial penalty and the harmful effects it has on the criminal legal system. 29 Concerns about the trial penalty are not limited to academics and other observers of our criminal justice system. In 2017, Judge Joseph Goodwin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia rejected a plea in an otherwise routine drug case, stating that:

with great irony, call a game. Rather, our Court’s tortured jurisprudence on appellate waivers has wreaked havoc on the lower courts, district attorneys, defense counsel and defendants, and is not worth any of the hypothetical benefits purportedly bestowed by appellate waivers. 31

[S]ecrecy surrounding plea bargains in heroin and opioid cases frequently undermines respect for the law and deterrence of crime. The bright light of the jury trial deters crime, enhances respect for the law, educates the public, and reinforces their sense of safety much more than a contract entered into in the shadows of a private meeting in the prosecutor’s office. 30

The Fourth Circuit upheld this decision in 2019, though it noted that the court might have abused its discretion had it rejected the plea based primarily on the government’s frequent use of the practice. Judge Goodwin rejected another plea on similar grounds in 2018. He is not alone: in 2014, Judge Jed Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court’s suggestion that a plea bargain is a fair and voluntary contractual arrangement between two relatively equal parties is a total myth: it is much more like a ‘contract of adhesion’ in which one party can effectively force its will on the other party.” In 2019, Judge Rowan Wilson of the New York Court of Appeals also raised concerns about how pleas operate in New York State. Dissenting in a case involving the waivers of appeal rights that often are required by the terms of a plea agreement, he noted that:

The game is not worth the candle. That is not to say this is a game: for many defendants, the harsh and chilling effect of appellate waivers results in the deprivation of their constitutional and statutory rights, far from anything one could, other than

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

CALIFORNIA’S DISAPPEARING TRIAL

The Committee on Revision of the Penal Code (the “Committee”), established by the California Legislature and Governor, has acknowledged that “[a]n overwhelming majority of criminal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining,” and that “[t]he severity of punishment . . . can often push people to plead guilty to avoid or be freed from incarceration, not because it is a fair resolution.” 32 Between 2021 and 2022, across California counties reporting data, 75% of felony cases resulted in guilty pleas while 20% of the felony cases reported were dismissed or transferred. Less than 3% of the felony cases reported went to trial. 33 The Committee also found that defendants who plead guilty typically receive shorter sentences than those convicted at trial, adding further pressure for defendants to agree to guilty pleas. 34 In testimony provided to the Committee, it was explained that “[p]retrial detention can . . . exert a lot of pressure for people to plead guilty, especially if a guilty plea is going to get them out of detention,” 35 and that the emotional and financial hardships of incarceration influence decision-making because people will do anything to avoid staying in jail. 36 Accordingly, the Committee recommended that steps be taken to lessen the undue pressure to plead guilty by limiting part of the uncertainty of what sentence a court may impose after trial. Recommended measures included: revisiting rules surrounding pretrial detention and expanding the grounds upon which detention can be reduced to include existence of a plea offer, reducing the instances in which the same fact can be used for conviction and enhancement, instructing jurors on lesser-related offenses if those may be considered instead, and creating a presumption of probation instead of incarceration for certain offenses. 37

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT CALIFORNIA SENTENCING PROVISIONS

California’s Determinate Sentencing Law creates a framework to guide judges when considering and imposing sentences. When the Determinate Sentencing Law was enacted in 1977, the vast majority of felonies were given three distinct terms of incarceration, lower, mid and upper, which are colloquially called the “triads.” The default terms were 16 months, two years and three years. The legislature set the triads for individual crimes over the following years for violent and sex crimes. Life and life without parole were also set as alternatives to the triad in the most serious crimes (murder, violent rape, etc.). California Penal Code §§ 1170 and 1170.1 set the basic rules for sentencing and selecting the term from the triad. The provisions required imposition of the middle term unless the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation outweighed that choice and required the upper or lower term. 38 In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court found this sentencing scheme unconstitutional in Cunningham v. California , 549 U.S. 270, 863-64 (2007), saying that “under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.” The legislature (over the objections of CACJ and many other civil rights players) amended § 1170 as recommended by the Attorney General and the California District Attorneys Association. They claimed the new wording removed the preference for any term and left the court free to choose the upper term without any facts proven to the jury. Each amendment had a sunset date.

Some legislators, defense attorneys, and advocates believed the amended language actually called for imposition of the lower term in all cases except where aggravating factors were used. They advocated for extension of the sunset date on § 1170 every time it came up. In 2021, the legislature passed a bill (SB 567) to amend §§ 1170 and 1170.1 to require that aggravators be pled and proved to a jury, or admitted by the accused. The bill did not include a sunset date. The State Supreme Court in 2024 held, per the intent of the legislation, that California courts cannot go above the midterm of the triad unless facts supporting the enhancement are proven to the jury or admitted by the defendant. People v. Lynch , 552 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2024). Consecutive sentencing is also determined by statute and the Rules of Court. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425. For most crimes it is up to the court to apply the Rules, but the legislature has set many requirements of consecutive sentencing, for some crimes and all enhancements. California Penal Code § 1170.1 establishes the principal term and subordinate terms for additional felony convictions sentenced. Finally, California has sentencing enhancements based on some eligible prior convictions, which are referred to as “strikes.” Defendants can receive enhanced sentences based on the number of prior strikes—one, two, or three (or more) prior strikes. Plea offers are sometimes conditioned on accepting (by defendants) a certain number of strikes or, alternatively, conditioned on agreements that prior strikes will not be used to enhance a sentence.

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

DEFINING THE TRIAL PENALTY: PRACTITIONER EXPERIENCES AND SURVEY RESULTS

The Task Force conducted an extensive survey followed by interviews with members of the criminal defense community which clearly showed the California defense bar’s belief that the trial penalty exists and is a significant issue in California. The trial penalty directly impacts those criminal defendants who elect to pursue their defense through trial, with those individuals receiving significantly longer and stricter sentences compared to those offered in pre-trial pleas. This, in turn, influences future criminal defendants, who are aware of the risks of pursuing their defense at trial regardless of their criminal culpability, coercing them to accept pleas and undermining their ability to assert potential defenses and exercise their fundamental rights, such as the right to receive discovery, including Brady material, 39 to challenge unlawfully obtained evidence, and the right to appeal, all of which a criminal defendant is typically required to waive as part of the plea process. This report includes both a broad review of survey and data analysis showing the extent to which the trial penalty exists in California, as well as individual case studies that present the real impact that the trial penalty has had on individual criminal defendants. 40

The survey included both narrow and open-ended questions, designed to obtain information about whether, and how, the trial penalty impacts criminal defense practice and outcomes for defendants in California. This online survey consisted of 80 questions about each attorney’s experiences with the trial penalty in California. A copy of the defense counsel survey is included in Appendix 1. The survey provided the following definition of the trial penalty: The “trial penalty” refers to the substantial difference between the sentence offered in a pre-trial plea bargain versus the sentence an accused receives after trial. Many believe this penalty is so severe and pervasive that it has virtually eliminated the constitutional right to a trial by effectively coercing guilty pleas. The trial penalty has not only eliminated trials, it has also undermined other rights established in the Constitution and which are essential to the adversarial system by requiring waivers of rights embedded in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Most notably this includes waivers of the right to Douglass W. Douglass W. was charged with carjacking in a Northern California county near San Francisco. After the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor offered a plea deal of 364 days in county jail if Douglass pled guilty to an offense that would constitute a strike. Douglass declined the offer, went to trial, and was eventually convicted and sentenced to 4 years in state prison. No additional facts came to light between the time the prosecutor had made the offer and the time of sentencing. Nonetheless, Douglass received a sentence 4-times longer than what the prosecutor had offered before trial.

SURVEY AND INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY

To conduct the survey, an initial outreach was made to the heads of all public defender offices and administrators of assigned counsel plans throughout the state as well as to private practitioners through the CACJ Foundation, California Criminal Bar Association, and NACDL to encourage participation from a diverse group of practitioners. In total, 738 defense attorneys from 53 of California’s 58 counties responded to the survey. Of the 53 counties where practitioners responded, 30 counties had at least five participants, with Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego Counties having the largest number of participants. For purposes of county-specific findings, only data from the 30 counties from which five or more responses to any particular question were received are being reported. 41

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

seek pre-trial release, the right to discovery, the right to receive exculpatory material, the right to conduct a meaningful investigation, the right to challenge unlawfully seized evidence, the right to develop mitigation, and the right to appeal.

A homeless man suffering from a drug addiction, who had a history of minor robberies, was accused of stealing a ring from another man in a train station. The officer who was on the scene stated that she thought she saw the homeless man take the ring, but the defendant maintained that it was a legitimate exchange. The officer was not wearing a bodycam, there were no other witnesses, and there was minimal investigation after the fact. The ring was returned to the alleged victim, and he did not participate in the criminal proceedings.

To provide further context and details on the experiences of individual practitioners with the trial penalty, the survey included open-ended questions for practitioners to describe specific cases they believe provide examples of the trial penalty. Additionally, two dozen survey participants participated in follow-up interviews to provide further details on cases and practitioner experiences with the trial penalty.

overwhelming majority of respondents answered “Yes.” Specifically, over 90% of survey respondents said the trial penalty was a factor in their county. In 12 of 30 counties for which more than five responses were recorded, 100% of respondents answered “Yes.” The lowest average affirmative response rate to the question from a county was 83%. The prosecutor charged the homeless man with a third strike, which would mean a sentence of 25 years to life. The defendant’s counsel suggested a plea deal to misdemeanor theft, but the prosecutor insisted on the 25 to life sentence. After pre-trial motions, where counsel detailed the facts, the judge questioned the prosecutor why there had been no plea agreement. It was only at that point that the prosecutor was willing to negotiate. He agreed to lower the charge to a misdemeanor, and the defendant was sentenced to time served.

DEFENSE COUNSEL PERSPECTIVE: TRIAL PENALTY AND COERCION One defense counsel’s response captures the essence of the trial penalty in California:

The client did not want to take the plea but even the judge iterated that if he did not accept the plea, she would have to sentence him to life in prison if he lost at trial. DA threatened enhancements.

The survey responses and corresponding interviews capture the perspectives of hundreds of practitioners across the state of California. The vast majority of respondents reported the existence of the trial penalty and cited the coercive role played by prosecutors, judges, or both. Respondents also provided further insights into a range of other aspects of the trial penalty including how it manifests, the populations it is most likely to affect, and its impact on procedural and rights-based issues. 42 Subsequent narrative interviews were conducted with a subset of practitioners. These narrative interviews provide additional specificity and supplementary context to the way the trial penalty is imposed across the state. Statewide survey responses were received in 53 counties out of 58 counties in California, representing a mix of urban, suburban, and rural communities. Existence and Occurrence of the Trial Penalty Defense practitioners across California affirmed that the trial penalty is both real and pervasive, though its severity and consistency vary across jurisdictions. Responses from across the state point overwhelmingly to the existence of the trial penalty. When asked, “Do you believe the trial penalty is a factor in this county?”, an

While survey respondents overwhelmingly reported that the trial penalty existed in their county, they also said that it varied from courthouse to courthouse and case to case. Respondents were asked in Q23–6, “If the trial penalty is a factor in your county, is the trial penalty uniform throughout the county, or does it vary significantly by courthouse, courtroom, or prosecutor?” Respondents were encouraged to check each answer that applied and only roughly nine percent of the responses provided

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THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL PENALTY: The Constitutional Right to Trial Under Attack 

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